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I Introduction
Police illegally search your house and uncover evidence against you.
Perhaps the trial judge suppresses this evidence; perhaps the judge does not
and you must seek appellate review. Regardless of the path, ultimately you
successfully defend yourself against the criminal charges. You seek damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 from the police for their unconstitutional conduct.
The applicable Supreme Court case law says that no § 1983 cause of action
lies if success on that claim "would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the
plaintiff's] conviction or sentence."2 As a counterexample, however, the
Court discusses your specific complaint, illegal search, in a footnote:
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable
search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-
outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The current incarnation ofthe statute provides in relevant
part
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Id.
2. Heock v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994).
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inevitable discovery, and especially hanness error, such a § 1983 action,
even if successful, would notnecessarilyimplythatthe plaintiff's convic-
tion was unlawful.
3
Is your claim timely? It depends on which U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
governs your claim: some courts say that all illegal search claims accrue at
the time of the search because no illegal search claim, by definition, "neces-
sarily implies" the invalidity of the conviction;4 others say that the district
court must determine whether success on the illegal search claim would imply
the invalidity ofthe conviction.' Of course, by starting the clock sooner, the
statute of limitations expires sooner in the first group of courts, making
otherwise justifiable § 1983 damages unavailable to many of those plaintiffs.6
The history of § 1983 supports the availability of damages for victims of
unconstitutional conduct. This famous statute, Section I ofthe Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, 7 grew out of the Reostruction-era effort to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment.! The Supreme Court has identified the following three
3. Id. at 487 n.7 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
4. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F3d 553, 559 n.4 (10th Cir.
1999) (adopting general exception approach under which illegal search claims accrue at time
of search); Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Datz v.
Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252,253 n.1 (1lth Cir. 1995) (same).
5. See, e.g., Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring
either favorable termination or demonstration that claim will not imply invalidity of conviction
before allowing § 1983 illegal search claim to accrue); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391,
399 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545,546 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
6. See, e.g., Beck, 195 F3d at 558 (ruling Heck never barred plaintiff's illegal search
claim, making that claim now stale under statute of limitations); Booker v. Ward, 94 F3d 1052,
1057 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing claim for illegal search and seizure of evidence, on which state
appellate court based its reversal of plaintiffs conviction, due to plaintiff's failure to bring civil
case within two-year statute of limitations); Franklin v. Summers, No. 93-2939,1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29997, at *3 (7th Cir. Oct 24, 1994) (dismissing illegal search claim of incarcerted
plaintiff as time-barred).
7. Act ofApr. 20,1871, ch. 22,17 Stat. 13.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. One impetus for the legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment was a message that
President Grant sent to Congress:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and
property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue
dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is
now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control
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purposes ofthis legislation: to override certain state laws, to provide a remedy
when state law is inadequate, and to provide a federal remedy when state law
is practically unavailable even iftheoretically adequate.9 InMonroe v. PapeY°
the Court ruled that a plaintiff could state a claim for damages under § 1983
against local officials." In Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents ofFederal
Bureau of Narcotics,12 the Court overcame the state-based limitations in the
scope of § 1983 by creating an analogous remedy against federal officials.
13
of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United
States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies
is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment
of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement
oflaw in all parts ofthe United States.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,172-73 (1961) (quoting CoNG. GL BE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1871)).
9. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74 (identifyfing purposes of § 1983).
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
11. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,187 (1961) (ruling that plaintiff; stated cause of
action against police officers), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soo. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe, six children and their parents sued under § 1983, alleging that
thirteen Chicago police officers conducted an illegal search and illegally arrested one of the
plaintiffs. Id at 169. The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs stated
no cause of action under § 1983 or the United States Constitution. Id. at 170. The Court
thoroughly examined the legislative history of the statute and concluded that the phrase "under
color of' law encompassed state and local officials. Id. at 171-87. Accordingly, the Court ruled
that the complaint stated a cause of action against the police officers. Id. at 187. The Court
then determined that the statute did not create liability on the part of municipal corporations
such as the City of Chicago. Id Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred and
argued that the Court's decisions in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), automatically controlled the interpretation of the "under
color" phrase. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter dissented,
examining the legislative history for himself and concluding that § 1983 provided a remedy only
when state law barred redress in state courts. Id. at 237 (Frankfirter, J., dissenting).
12. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
13. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 389 (1971) (holding that federal agent who violates Fourth Amendment while acting under
color of law is liable for damages). In Bivens, the plaintiff alleged that federal narcotics agents
searched his house and arrested him without probable cause or a warrant Id. The government
argued that plaintiff's appropriate remedy lay under state law, but the Court rejected this view
as "unduly restrictive." IR at 391. The Court stated that the remedy available for a Fourth
Amendment violation did not depend on any substantive state law. "the Fourth Amendment
operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in
whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if en-
gaged in by a private citizen." Id. at 392. The Court rejected the government's argument that
the Fourth Amendment served only as a limitation on federal defenses to state suits. Id at 394.
The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment and state privacy or trespass laws would some-
times conflict, meaning that the Fourth Amendment implies an independent cause of action.
Id. at 395. The Court determined that damages were an appropriate remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation. Id at 397. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, noting that the
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For the purposes ofthis Note, Bivens actions and § 1983 actions are analyti-
cally identical.
14
The Court considers compensation via damages to be an important goal
of § 1983 actions.' 5 Although the Forty-Second Congress may not have
specifically addressed damages, the Court has stated that Congress must have
contemplated the availability of damages when framing the § 1983 remedy.' 6
The Court has identified deterrence as a secondary purpose of the statute, but
one that operates bestthroughthe imposition of damages." As with common-
Court had the power to create federal remedies for constitutional violations. Id at 403 (Harlan,
J., concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that, although the
exclusionary rule was an "an anomalous and ineffective mechanism with which to regulate law
enforcement," the Court should not create an alternative remedy but should wait instead for
Congress to do so. Id. at 420-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Black dissented on the
grounds that Congress could have explicitly created a remedy against federal officials similar
to § 1983 had it so desired. Id at 427-28 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun dissented,
fearing that the Court's opinion would lead to "another avalanche of now federal cases." Id. at
430 (31ackmun, J., dissenting).
14. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (stating that both Bivens and § 1983
allow plaintiff to recover damages for violations of Fourth Amendment). Because Bivens
actions and § 1983 actions are analytically similar in the context of this Note, I will simply use
§ 1983 as shorthand for both actions for the remainder of this Note, except for obvious concepts
such as federalism that only apply to § 1983.
15. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) ("[IThe basic purpose of a § 1983
damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights .... ."). For a criticism of the Court's blanket provision of damages for all
constitutional torts, see John C. Jeifries, Jr.,DisaggregatingConstitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J.
259, 262 (2000) ("Even though we know that rights and remedies are connected, interactive,
and mutually dependent and defining, constitutional tort law pretends that it is not so." (footnote
omitted)).
16. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 256 (stating that concept of compensatory damages for
deprivation of rights "hardly could have been foreign" to Congress in 1871). Remarks of
legislators during the floor debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act indicate that at least some thought
the statute created a damages remedy. One Indiana representative stated, "This section gives
to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights, privileges, or immunities of
person or property, a civil action for damages against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts."
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 178 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,App., p. 50 (1871)). An
Ohio senator regarded the section as authorizing suit for any amount of damages:
The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the damages in the
estimation of any sensible man may not be five dollars or even five cents; they may
be what lawyers call merely nominal damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction
of that civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its being prosecuted as
now in the courts of the States.
Id at 180 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess.,App., p. 2 16 (1871)).
17. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,307 (1986) (stating that
deterrence "operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatoy"); Carey, 435
U.S. at 256-57 ("[There is no evidence that [Congress] meant to establish a deterrent more
formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages.").
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law torts, punitive damages may be available to § 1983 plaintiff who suffer
willful or malicious violations of their constitutional rights," although the
award of punitive damages is not itself a right, but merely a "discretionary
moral judgment" by the jury.19 Damages for violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment are included in this compensatory scheme - after all, the claim in Mon-
roe, the granddaddy of § 1983 damages actions, alleged that officers illegally
searched the plaintfi' home.20
Because searches in violation ofthe Fourth Amendment invariably occur
in the course of criminal investigations, many victims will face prosecution
as a result of the illegal search. One issue concurrently facing victims con-
templating civil redress is the statute of limitations. State personal injury laws
provide the relevant statutes of limitations for § 1983 claims.21 The question
of when these claims accrue becomes important because these limitations
periods generally offer a short window for filing a civil claimP - a window in
which a potential § 1983 plaintiff may be incarcerated.
InHeckv. Humphrey,' the Supreme Court considered when § 1983 claims
generally accrue. The Heck Court held that a prisoner who seeks damages for
government actions which, if unlawful, would invalidate his conviction or
sentence can state no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until he demon-
strates that his conviction has been otherwise invalidated.24 Thus, the § 1983
18. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56 (1983) (holding punitive damages maybe available
in § 1983 cases involving "reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others"). For examples ofcases meriting punitive damages, seeMelear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177,
1187 (5th Cir. 1989) (punitive damages appropriate against intoxicated officer who held suspect
at gunpoint during warrantless search ofapartment), and Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516,1525
(10th Cir. 1987) (punitive damages appropriate against officer who, during early-morning illegal
search, threatened to take plaintiffto jail and refused to allow her to call her attorney).
19. Wade,461 U.S. at 52.
20. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,170 (1961) (identifying basis of plaintiffs' claim).
21. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1985) (ruling that state statute of
limitations for personal injury actions governs § 1983 claims); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478,484 (1980) ("In § 1983 actions ... a state statute of limitations and the coordinate
tolling rules are more than a technical obstacle to be circumvented if possible. In most cases,
they are binding rules of law.").
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(1) (1993) (two-year statute of limitations); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-33 (1982) (two years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(lXa) (Michie 2000) (one
year); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1994) (two years); VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-
243 (Michie 2000) (two years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 1990) (three years).
23. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
24. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994) (requiring that plaintiffs demon-
strate favorable termination in order to state claim for damages for actions whose illegality would
imply invalidity of conviction). In Heck, the Court determined whether an incarcerated plaintiff
could challenge his conviction via a damages suit under § 1983. Id. Heck sought damages for
alleged unconstitutional conduct on the part of prosecutors and police officials. Id. at 479. The
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claim does not accrue until the plaintiff first achieves a favorable termination
of the criminal proceedings.ns In footnote seven of the opinion, the Court
offered a § 1983 action for damages from an illegal search as an illustrative
example of a claim that might not imply the invalidity of a conviction. 26 The
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals are badly divided over the proper interpreta-
tion of this footnote, with one group holding that the footnote allows immedi-
ate accrual of all illegal search claims,' and the opposing group requiring a
case-by-case examination of the plaintiff's claim before allowing accrual.'
This Note suggests that the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by
Court began its analysis by identifying the conflict between § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with the latter containing a state remedies exhaustion requirement. Id
at 480. The Court noted its holding inPreiser v. Ro&iguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), that Congress
established habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy for state prisoners challenging the fact or
length of their confinement, but determined that Preise?"s holding directly addressed only § 1983
suits seeking injunctive relief. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481-82. Looking to common law for guidance,
the Court determined that an action for malicious prosecution was the closest common-law
analogue to Heck's suit. Iii at484. The Court then discussed the element ofmalicious prosecu-
tion requiring termination of the underlying criminal proceeding in favor of the civil plaintiff
(favorable termination). Id. The Court determined that this element was appropriate for § 1983
damages suits by prisoners because favorable termination would ensure that prisoners could not
collaterally attack their convictions via civil actions. I at 484-86. Accordingly, the Court held
that such § 1983 plaintiffs must prove 'that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal ... , or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Ie. at 486-87. The Court
directed district courts hearing such cases to determine "whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffwould necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. Absent
favorable termination, such a suit could not go forward, unless a plaintiff could demonstrate that
a successful civil action would not effectively invalidate his conviction. Id.
Justice Thomas concurred, blaming the collision betweenthe habeas statute and § 1983 on
the Court's expansive application of both statutes. Id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, concurred in the judgment but
disagreed with the court's malicious-prosecution analysis. Id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Souter questioned why the Court chose to incorporate the favorable-termina-
tion element of malicious prosecution while leaving behind other elements, such as probable
cause. Id. at 494 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Souter instead analyzed the case
under Preiser to determine that Heck's suit could not proceed. Id. at 497-98 (Souter, J., concur-
ring injudgment).
25. Id. at 486-87.
26. See id. at 487 n.7 (stating that illegal search claim would not necessarily imply in-
validity of conviction).
27. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 559 n.4 (10th Cir.
1999) (adopting general exception approach); Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648
(7th Cir. 1998) (same); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252,253 n.1 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (same); see inf a
Part IV.B (discussing general exception approach).
28. See, e.g., Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring
favorable termination or demonstration that claim will not imply invalidity of conviction);
Shamacizadch v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Woods v. Candela, 47
F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); see infra Part IV.C (discussing case-by-case approach).
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affirning the approach of the latter set of courts and holding that footnote
seven still requires that courts examine a § 1983 illegal search claim on a
case-by-case basis to determine the effect of that claim on the validity of the
underlying conviction.
Part II of this Note emphasizes the importance of this issue by outlining
the significant remedial role of damages in the context of Fourth Amendment
violations, comparing and contrasting the damages remedy with the exclu-
sionary rule." Part I of this Note analyzes the Heck opinion to discern the
principles courts should use in interpreting footnote seven. 0 Part IV of this
Note examines decisions from both sides ofthe circuit split. Part IV then con-
cludes that the courts requiring case-by-case determinations of accrual more
directly conform to the Heck opinion.
31
H. The Necessity of a Damages Remedy for Fourth Amendment Violations
Judges and scholars have devoted much ink to the debate about which
remedies are appropriate for Fourth Amendment violations. As seen in cases
like Monroe and Bivens, one possible remedy is the provision of damages.32
Another traditional option is the exclusionary rule, by which courts refuse to
admit evidencmthat officers seize illegally.33 The Court has long enforced the
exclusionary rule against federal officials34 and extended the scope of the rule
to encompass state prosecutions." The Court has made clear that the exclu-
sionary rule is judicially created, rather than constitutionally mandated." The
29. See infra Part H (discussing advantages and disadvantages of exclusionary rule and
damages).
30. See infra Part HI (discussing opinions of Seventh Circuit, Supreme Court majority,
and Supreme Court concurrence in Heck).
31. See infra Part rV (discussing circuit court cases interpreting footnote seven).
32. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395 (1971) ("That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of
the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition.");
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,187 (1961) (concluding plaintiffs' complaint for damages stated
cause of action).
33. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence seized in
violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state courts).
34. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (stating that introduction at
trial of evidence that federal officers illegally seized was prejudicial error and violated constitu-
tional rights of accused); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886) (stating that Fourth
Amendment protected "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence").
35. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (stating that introduction of illegally-seized evidence in
state criminal trial offended Fourth Amendment).
36. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974) ("[T]he rule is ajudicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.").
1500
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exclusionary rule is thus a quasi-constitutional twist on the common-law
remedy of restitution. 7 Phrased in restitutionary language, the government
must forfeit its unjustly obtained evidentiary prize in the underlying criminal
proceeding.
s3
There is no shortage of criticism of this evidentiary rule, which Chief
Justice Burger once called "conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in
accomplishing its stated objective.n39 The most fervent critics of the exclu-
sionary rule, such as Professor AkhilAmar, seek to completely replace the rule
with a civil damages remedy' or perhaps administratively-awarded damages."
Professor Amar argues thatthe Framers intended civil damages, rather than the
exclusion of evidence, to be the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.42
Because officers suffer little or no personal loss from an adverse ruling at a
suppression hearing, the deterrent effects of exclusion may be negligible at
best.43 Exclusion is an all-or-nothing approachthat disproportionately rewards
the guiltiest defendants, those most likely to be convicted ifthe court admits the
evidence, whereas damages are flexible.' Furthermore, exclusion provides no
remedy for the innocent victim of an illegal search that uncovers no evidence
at all and therefore produces nothing for a court to exclude.
Defenders of the exclusionary rule characterize its oversimplicity as a
virtue: it suffers from no problems of valuation; its penalty-free restitutionary
remedy does not overdeter legitimate police conduct.4" A damages remedy,
37. See Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule andDamages: An Economic Compari-
son ofPrivate Remediesfor Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1443, 1443
(identifying exclusionary rule as based on unjust enrichment).
38. See id, at 1444 (noting that consequence of exclusionary rule is that "prosecution...
must proceed without the benefit of its ill-gotten gain"). In contrast, a damages remedy
considers the victim's loss, not the government's gain. Id.
39. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
415 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
40. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
759 (1994) (promoting role of civil juries and damages actions to regulate government conduct);
id. at 812-16 (outlining proper role of compensatory, punitive, and presumed damages in
remedying Fourth Amendment violations).
41. See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999
U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 405 (advocating establishment of administrative agency to assess Fourth
Amendment claims).
42. See Amar, supra note 40, at 786 (stating that framers "clearly ... presupposed" tort
remedies).
43. See L. Timothy Perrin et al.,IfIt's Broken, Fix It MovingBeyond the Exclusionary
Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 734 (1998) (stating that primary conclusion from empirical study
of police attitudes was "failure of the exclusionary rule to effectively deter police misconduct").
44. SeeAmar, supra note 40, at 798 ("Money is infinitely divisible; exclusion is clunky.").
45. See Jeffries, supra note 15, at 265 ("Nowhere is the fear of overdeterrence more
plausible than in claims of illegal search and seizure."); William J. Stunlz, Warrants andFourth
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on the other hand, becomes difficult to value, particularly because the most
likely injuries for the innocent plaintiff are emotional harms. 6 Even with a
reasonable civil claim, recovery of damages may be unlikely because juries
will tend to believe police rather than a civil plaintiff potentially involved in
criminal activity and because the officers themselves may be judgment-
proof.47 Additionally, because police gain little personally from a "successful"
and "clean" search, critics of damages allege that even an economically ideal
amount of damages will overdeter police.' Exclusion supporters fiuther
believe that a pure damages system with no exclusion remedy, allowing the
government to pay damages in order to purchase the admission of illegally-
obtained evidence, would taint the judicial system.
49
Because of the inherent problems with the exclusionary rule, especially
the limitation of its remedy to those victims against whom the police actually
recover evidence,5" I believe that some damages remedy is necessary to vindi-
cate Fourth Amendment rights. Only damages adequately satisfy the concept
of corrective justice embodied in the Constitution. ' To be sure, the current
AmendmentRemedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,883-84 (1991) (stating that exclusionary rule solves
problems associated with valuation and deterrence).
46. See Stuntz, supra note 45, at 902 (examining difficulties in valuation).
47. See Perrin et al., supra note 43, at 739-40 (stating that juries are likely to be unsympa-
thetic to § 1983 plaintiffs and individual officers are unlikely to be able to pay judgment); Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio andBeyond The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1387-88 (1983)
(identiiing practical difficulties with damages remedy). The judgment-proof nature of many
officers is important because respondeat superior liability is unavailable under § 1983. Monell
v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,691 (1978).
48. See Jeifries, supra note 15, at 267 ("This asymmetry in the availability of redress
reinforces the incentives for government officers to protect themselves by doing less."); Stunlz,
supra note 45, at 903 (stating that potentially liable police "can simply choose to minimize
searches and arrests, or at least to avoid them in all but clear cases").
49. See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 69 (1994) (citing one attorney's description of goal of exclu-
sionary rule as judicial integrity rather than regulation ofpolice conduct).
50. See Jeffhies, supra note 15, at 284 ("There are many other reasons to search, including
self-protection, destruction of contraband, maintenance of police authority, and simple harass-
ment. A threat to suppress evidence that the police do not expect to find or intend to use is next
to meaningless." (footnote omitted)).
51. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance ofFault, 88 MIca. L. REV. 82, 94 (1988) (noting that corrective justice is persua-
sive justification for awarding constitutional tort damages). Jefflies outlines the concept of
corrective justice as follows:
[G]overnment wrongdoing that causes individual injury should be redressed by the
award of damages .... The government has achieved a wrongful gain (some more
effective or less costly implementation of government policy) by inflicting a
wrongful loss. The award of damages from government to victim at once annuls
the wrongful gain and rectifies the wrongful loss. The payment from wrongdoer to
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§ 1983 damages regime does not provide for recovery in all justifiable situa-
tions, due to obstacles like state sovereign immunity, municipal immunity
from respondeat superior liability, and qualified immunity for law enforce-
ment officers.52 I take no position on the question of how a damages regime
should operate, be it civil or administrative,53 and I think that, for reasons of
judicial integrity, courts should retain some form of the exclusionary rule. 4
For the purpose ofthis Note, I simply submit that, no matter what form a dam-
ages remedy may take, courts should make damages as available as possible,
but should do so while respecting competing judicial values such as consis-
tency, finality, and federalism. One facet of this procedural operation is the
basic question of when a constitutional damages claim accrues.
11. The Accrual of Damages Claims with Conviction Outstanding:
Heck v. Humphrey
A. Background
In Heckv. Humphrey, the Supreme Court determined whether a prisoner
may sue for damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conduct
relating to his conviction. s An Indiana state court jury convicted Roy Heck
victim retraces the moral relationship between them. To the extent possible, it
undoes the wrong. The point is not merely that the loss is offset. . . , but that the
loss is rectified by damages from the wrongdoer.
Id. (emphasis in original).
52. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,614 (1999) (stating that qualified immunity gener-
ally shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability as long as their
conduct "'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known"' (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982))); Wl v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,67 (1989) (determining that Congress
did not intend § 1983 to abolish state sovereign immunity); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding municipality not liable for § 1983 damages unless it approved or
adopted challenged custom or policy); Surell BradyArrests WithoutProsecution and the Fourth
Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 72 (2000) (identifying immunity obstacles to § 1983 recovery);
Jeffries, supra note 51, at 85-86 (stating that because some form ofiimmunity usually is available
for all government officials, "[o]nly in extreme or flagrant cases will damages likely be paid").
53. See Perrin et al., supra note 43, at 743-44 (proposing retention of exclusionary rule for
evidence seized via willful or intentional police misconduct, with administrative damages
remedy available for victims of reckless, negligent, or innocent police conduct); Alan Dalsass,
Note, Options: An Alternative Perspective on Fourth Amendment Remedies, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 2297, 2315-16 (1998) (advocating hybrid model incorporating damages and exclusion
remedies); id. at 2299 ("While the exclusionary rule and liquidated damages are generally
considered mutually exclusive, in actuality the application of one remedy method need not occur
at the expense ofthe other.").
54. See Maclin, supra note 49, at 69 (offering judicial integrity as justification for exclu-
sionary rule).
55. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,478 (1994) (stating issue as whether state
prisoner may challenge constitutionality of conviction via damages suit under § 1983).
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1493 (2001)
of the voluntary manslaughter of his wife.56 While serving his fifteen-year
sentence, and while appealing his conviction, Heck fled suit in federal district
court under § 1983. 57 This suit, which named a prosecutor, an attorney, and
a state police investigator as defendants, alleged misconduct during the crim-
inal investigation, destruction of exculpatory evidence, and use of an illegal
voice identification procedure at trial.5 8 Heck sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages, but no injunctive relief, such as release from custody. 9
The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice on the grounds that
the claim directly implicated the legality of Heck's conviction and confine-
ment.' While his civil appeal was pending, Heck's direct challenges to his
conviction failed: The Indiana Supreme Court upheld his conviction, and a
federal district court denied his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus due
to unexhausted claims."' The district court then denied a second habeas peti-
tion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.62
B. Analysis Under Equitable Tolling: The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck's § 1983 action.63
Chief Judge Richard Posner, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, deter-
mined that Heck had failed to exhaust his state remedies against unlawful
conviction.' The court ruled that a prisoner seeking damages under § 1983
for allegedly unconstitutional conduct relating to his conviction is essentially
challenging the legality of his conviction, regardless of whether he seeks
damages or injunctive release from confinement.65 Moreover, the court con-
cluded that such a suit is effectively a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
which requires state exhaustion.66
56. Id.; see Heck v. State, 552 N.E.2d 446, 448-49 (Ind. 1990) (discussing facts of
underlying criminal conviction).




61. Id.; see Heck v. State, 522 N.E2d 446, 453 (Ind. 1990) (upholding conviction and
sentence).
62. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,479 (1994); see Heck v. Richards, 976 F.2d 735
(7th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (upholding denial of'writ of habeas corpus).
63. See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling that district court
properly dismissed suit rather than staying it).
64. Id. at357.
65. Id.
66. See id. ("[T]hc plaintiff must exhaust his state remedies, on pain of dismissal if he
fails to do so." (citing Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1989); Scruggs v. Moel-
lering, 870 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1989); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam))); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994) (prohibiting grant of writ of habeas corpus
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The more difficult question before the court was whether to stay or dis-
miss the civil action.' A dismissal would leave Heck vulnerable to a statute
of limitations defense if he refiled after completion of his sentence. 6" The
court noted decisions of several other circuits staying similar suits rather than
dismissing them, but ultimately disagreed with the conclusions reached by
those courts.69 The Seventh Circuit believed that the other courts gave "inade-
quate weight to the policy of the statute of limitations, which is to bar stale
suits." he court suggested that plaintiffs later attempting to overcome a
statute of limitations defense could seek equitable tolling, whereby "a person
is not required to sue within the statutory period if he cannot in the circum-
stances reasonably be expected to do so."71 The court's rationale for prefer-
ring equitable tolling to a stay was that
[r]ather than giving the plaintiff an automatic extension of indefinite
duration, no matter how much his carelessness or sloth may have contrib-
uted to the delayinthe prosecution of his claim, the doctrine of equitable
tolling gives the plaintiffjust so much extra time as he needs, despite all
due diligence on hispart, to file his claim.... There must be diligence,
and the diligence must continue up to the time of suit - you cannot be
diligent for a year, and then wait another year to sue.72
Although this approach was justifiable from an equitable perspective, it
suffered from a major shortcoming from a legal perspective: Indiana had not
established an equitable tolling doctrine applicable to this set of facts, and
state statutes of limitations and tolling provisions apply to § 1983 actions. 3
Consulting Supreme Court precedent, the court determined that Congress
"intended that 'gaps in federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law,'
but only 'as long as that law is not inconsistent with federal law' and does not
"unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State").
67. Heck, 997 F.2d at 357.
68. See id. (noting that plaintiff's imprisonment did not toll applicable two-year Indiana
statute of limitations (citing IND. CODE §§ 34-1-2-2,34-1-67-1(6) (1986); Owens v. Okure, 488
U.S. 235 (1989); Bailey v. Faulkner, 765 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1985))).
69. Id (citing Jewell v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam);
Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1990); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 n2
(8th Cir. 1987); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366,373 (5th Cir. 1981)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Cent States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369,
1376 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
72. IM (citation omitted).
73. See id. at 358 (stating court's opinion that federal tolling doctrine would apply if
Indiana refused to apply state doctrine in circumstances of present case, while noting general
applicability of state statutes of limitations and tolling doctrines in § 1983 actions (citing Hardin
v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980))).
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1493 (2001)
defeat section 1983's 'chief goals of compensation and deterrence."'7 4 Ac-
cordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Heck's complaint." Ironically,
the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split that this Seventh Circuit decision
created,76 but the Supreme Court wound up creating another.
C. Analysis Under Common-Law Principles: The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the conflict be-
tween § 1983 and habeas corpus as prisoner remedies. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, first rejected the notion that Preiser v. Rodriguez,77 which
required prisoners challenging the fact or length of their confinement to ex-
haust state remedies, or Wolffv. McDonnell, 5 which barred injunctive relief
74. Id at 358 (quoting Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1989)) (citation omitted).
75. M at359.
76. See i at 357 (noting decisions of other circuits granting stays to § 1983 claims rather
than dismissing them (citing Jewel v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1990); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256,
1258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366,373 (5th Cir. 1981))).
77. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). In Preiser, New York deprived inmates of good-time credits
during a disciplinary proceeding, and the inmates challenged the deprivation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. at 476. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, examined the history of the federal
habeas corpus statute and determined that the plaintiffs' suits "fell squarely within this tradi-
tional scope of habeas corpus." Id. at 484-87. The Court noted that the plaintiffs were chal-
lenging the validity of any future confinement beyond the time at which the accumulated good-
time credits would compel their release. Id. at 487. The prisoners argued that a § 1983 action
was more appropriate because their claims fell directly within the language of that statute and
because habeas would require state exhaustion first. Id. at 488-89. The Court stated that Con-
gress clearly intended that prisoners challenging the fact or length of their confinement exhaust
state remedies and that permitting a § 1983 suit would subvert that intent and cause unnecessary
friction between federal and state courts. Id. at 489-91. The Court held that "when a state
prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he
seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id at 500. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented on the grounds that Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971), allowed § 1983 suits challenging the conditions of confinement and that
the Court could draw no meaningful or workable distinction between suits challenging the
conditions of confinement and those challenging the length of confinement Preiser, 411 U.S.
at 500-01,506 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, Nebraska prison inmates challenged various prison
procedures and policies in a § 1983 suit, including due process violations in the deprivation of
good-time credits. Id at 542-43. Justice White, writing for the Court, determined that Preiser
barred injunctive restoration of the good-time credits. Id. at 554. However, the Court allowed
the portion of the suit seeking damages to proceed. Id at 554-55. Examining Nebraska's
procedures, the Court concluded that the procedures had some unconstitutional aspects, but
declined to impose the full range of procedures identified in Morrisrey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Wolff,418 U.S. at 560. The Court stated
that Nebraska must provide "advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written
statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
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under Preiser but allowed a damages claim to proceed, controlled the instant
case. 7  The Court then determined that the relevant inquiry was not exhaus-
tion, but whether Heck's claim was cognizable under § 1983.0 Looking to
common-law torts for a guiding analogy, the Court found malicious prosecu-
tion to be most analytically appropriate."1 The Court then discussed the
specific element of malicious prosecution that requires a plaintiff to prove
prior termination of the criminal proceeding in his favor.' This element
avoids inconsistent results and limits the opportunity for collateral attack on
a conviction, which the Court found consistent with its own precedents. 3
Accordingly, the Court held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal autho-
rized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
The Court directed a district court hearing such a § 1983 case to deter-
mine whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his convic-
tion or sentence was invalid." If so, then the district court should dismiss the
action unless the plaintiff satisfies the favorable-termination element."6 If a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would not imply that his conviction or
action taken." IM at 563. The Court declined to mandate certain trial-type procedures, such as
confrontation and cross-examination, that could create "considerable potential for havoc inside
the prison walls." Id. at 567. The Court refused to apply the due process requirements retroac-
tively, which would force the state to eliminate previous disciplinary judgments from inmates'
records. Id. at 573. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part, accusing the majority of rendering inmates' due process rights "empty promises."
Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas dissented
in part and argued that any deprivation of a prisoner's liberty required "a full hearing with all
due process safeguards." Id. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
79. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,481 (1994) (determining that Preiser did not
cover instant case); i at 482 (determining that Wolffdid not cover instant case).
80. Id. at483.
81. See id at 484 (stating that malicious prosecution is closest analogue because it "per-
mits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process").
82. Id. at484 (citing Carpenterv. Nutter, 59 P. 301 (1899); W. KEETONETAL.,PROSSER
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 874 (5th ed. 1984)).
83. See id. at 484-85 ("This Court has long expressed similar concerns for finality and
consistency and has generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack. .. ." (cita-
tions omitted)).
84. Id at 486-87 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 487.
86. Id.
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invalid, however, the Court would allow such an action to proceed. 7 By
holding that a § 1983 action does not even accrue until the favorable-termina-
tion element is satisfied, the Court avoided the pitfalls ofthe Seventh Circuit's
equitable tolling approach
8
D. Analysis Under Preiser v. Rodriguez: Justice Souter's Concurrence
Although the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the dismissal of
Heck's suit, four Justices departed from Justice Scalia's analysis." Justice
Souter concurred inthe judgment but disagreed with the majority's reliance on
common-law principles? He criticized the selective incorporation of one
isolated element of malicious prosecution, pointing out that incorporating its
other elements, such as the absence of probable cause, would severely limit a
§ 1983 plaintiff's remedy for a constitutional tort.91 Additionally, Justice
Souter saw no reasonwhymalicious prosecution provides a closer common-law
analogy than abuse of process, which also allows for damages for confinement
but which does not contain a favorable-termination requirement.' He noted
that in malicious prosecution cases, courts historically disallowed the type of
damages sought by Heck because a conviction constituted irrefutable evidence
of probable cause at common law.'
87. Id.
88. Compare id. at 489 ("Under our analysis the statute of limitations poses no difficulty
while the state challenges are being pursued, since the § 1983 claim has not yet arisen.") with
Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling equitable tolling necessary to
avoid statute of limitations bar to prisoner suit filed after completion of sentence).
89. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,491-503 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring injudg-
ment); infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing Heck). Justice Thomas, a member
of the majority, also concurred briefly. See id. at 490-91 (Thomas, J., concurring) (blaming
Court's expansion of both § 1983 and habeas corpus for creating conflicts necessitating resolu-
tion).
90. See id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]e have consistently refused
to allow common-law analogies to displace statutory analysis, declining to import even well-
settled common-law rules into § 1983 'if the statute's] history or purpose counsel against
applying [such rules] in § 1983 actions.'" (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992))
(citations omitted) (second and third alterations in original)).
91. See id. at 494 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that police or prosecutor
with probable cause could defeat claim even of plaintiffwhose conviction appellate court over-
turned as unconstitutional).
92. Id at 495 (Souter, J., concurring injudgment). In a footote, the majority responded
to the abuse of process analogy: "Cognizable injury for abuse of process is limited to the harm
caused by the misuse of process, and does not include harm (such as conviction and confine-
ment) resulting from that process's being carried through to its lawful conclusion." Id. at 486
n.5. Justice Souter responded in turn that because neither common-law tort exactly matches a
§ 1983 claim for damages for unlawful confinement or conviction, some cases may arise in
which abuse of process provides a closer analogy than malicious prosecution. Id. at 495 n.2
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
93. Id at 495-96 (Souter, J.,concurringinjudgment).
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Justice Souter preferred to analyze the case under Preiser, which subordi-
nated the breadth of § 1983 to the specificity of the federal habeas corpus
statute. 4 Although Preiser considered injunctive relief, Justice Souter saw no
reason why Preiser's holding should not extend to a damages claim for
unlawful conviction or confinement? Under his Preiser analysis, Justice
Souter concluded that "the statutory scheme must be read as precluding such
[collateral] attacks" via § 1983.6
Despite the difference in analysis, Justice Souter ultimately agreed with
imposing the favorable-termination requirement on state prisoners as a means
of encouraging habeas petitions before seeking damages.' However, in a
view that now commands a majority of the Court, he refused to apply the
favorable-tennination requirement to § 1983 plaintiffs who were not incarcer-
ated at the time of the civil action, such as those fined, those who served
relatively short sentences, or those who faultlessly failed to discover a consti-
tutional violation until after completing a sentence? The main effect of
Justice Souter's concurrence was "not [to] cast doubt on the ability of an
individual unaffected by the habeas statute to take advantage of the broad
reach of § 1983."' Despite some analytical appeal in the malicious prosecu-
tion context, however, the concurrence provides no answer to the illegal
search question because habeas corpus is not an available vehicle to redress
Fourth Amendment violations.1°°
94. See id. at 497 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("We are not, however, in any such
strait, for our enquiry in this case may follow the interpretive methodology employed in
[Preiser]... ."(citations omitted)).
95. See id. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("[M]ounting damages against the
defendant-officials for unlawful confinement.., would, practically, compel the State to release
the prisoner.").
96. Id. (Souter, J., concurring injudgment).
97. Id. (Souter, J., concurring injudgment); see id. at 499 (Souter, J., concurring injudg-
ment) ("It may be that the Court's analysis takes it no further than I would go, and that any
objection I may have to the Court's opinion is to style, not substance.").
98. See id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring injudgment) ("Mhe result would be to deny any
federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a
favorable state ruling ... [because] individuals not 'in custody' cannot invoke federal habeas
jurisdiction .... ."). Five Justices have now explicitly supported Justice Souter's refusal to apply
the favorable-termination requirement to § 1983 plaintiffs who are no longer incarcerated, with
Justice Ginsburg, a member of the Heck majority, now endorsing Justice Souter's view. See
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,18-21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring) (joined by O'Connor, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, J.3.) (rejecting plaintiff's argumentthatHeckwould bar reliefwithout favorable
termination and therefore that habeas claim could not be moot); id. at 21-22 (Ginsburg, I., con-
curring) (same); id. at25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Souter's rationale).
99. Hck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,503 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring injudgment).
100. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976) (stating that Constitution does not
require availability of habeas to remedy introduction of illegally-seized evidence as long as
criminal defendant has adequate opportunity to argue for exclusion in state proceedings).
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IV Footnote Seven and § 1983 Damages for Illegal
Search and Seizure
The Court's ruling inHeck deniedthe accrual of a § 1983 claim for dam-
ages that would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sen-
tence." In footnote seven of its opinion, the Court provided an example of
a claim that might not imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or
sentence and that, consequently, would not require favorable termination:
For example, a suitfor damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable
search may lie even ff the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiffs still-
outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and
inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action,
even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's convic-
tion was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory damages, however,
the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but
that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today, does
not encompass the "injury" of being convicted and imprisoned (until his
conviction has been overturned)."°
Although useful as an illustration, the Court's example ultimately spawned
a marked split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. On one hand, the
Seventh, 03 Eighth,104 Tenth, 05 and Eleventh0a Circuits have held that footnote
101. Heck, 512 U.S. at487.
102. Id. at 487 n.7 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
103. See Copus v. City ofEdgerton, 151 F3d 646,648 (7th Cir. 1998) (advocating general
exception approach).
104. Cf Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F3d 1093,1095 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying footnote seven
to analyze § 1983 claim for coerced confession).
105. See Beekv. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 559 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999)
(advocating general exception approach).
106. See Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (adopting
general exception approach). Datz sued police officers for damages, alleging an illegal search
despite the state criminal trial court's determination that either Datz consented to the search in
question or the police officers had probable cause to conduct the search. Id. at 253. The court's
opinion granted Heck only a passing footnote in concluding that illegal search claims always
could proceed: "Heck v. Humphrey is no bar to Datz' civil action because, even if the pertinent
search did violate the Federal Constitution, Data' conviction might still be valid considering
such doctrines as inevitable discovery, independent source, and harmless error." Id. at 253 n.1
(citation omitted). No Eleventh Circuit appellate eases challenge Datz, although one magistrate
judge has departed from the general exception. See Duncan v. Smith, No. 97-0129-P-S, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9756, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 1997) (Steele, Mag. J.) (determining that plain-
tiff's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims implicated outstanding conviction); Day v. Keahey, No.
96-0156-CB-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6082, at *12 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 1996) (Steele, Mag. J.)
(determining that no evidence beyond that which plaintiff challenged in § 1983 action supported
plaintiff's conviction).
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seven exempts illegal search and seizure damages claims from Heck's favor-
able-terminationrequirement. Converselythe Second ' 0 Sixth,"1 andNinth' °
Circuits have held that no such exception exists and thatthese types of § 1983
claims"' do not accrue unless success in the civil action would not undermine
the validity of the criminal conviction. The Fifth Circuit appears to side with
the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, 1' but the Fourth Circuit leans toward
a modified interpretation ofthe general exception." 2 The Third Circui?13 has
reached inconsistent results on this question among its district courts, and
even among different chambers in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." 4
107. See Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545,546 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring favorable termina-
tion).
108. See Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391,399 (6th Cir. 1999) (requiring favorable
termination).
109. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008,1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring favorable
termination).
110. Courts also consistently have applied Heck to Bivens actions. See Wfliams v. Hill,
74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The rationale of Heck applies equally to claims against
federal officials in Bivens actions.").
11. See Salts v. Moore, 107 F. Supp. 2d 732,737 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (undertaking individ-
ualized determination); Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744,746 (5th Cir. 1995) (deciding record
was insufficient to determine whether civil suit would imply invalidity of potential conviction).
112. See Brooks v. City ofWmston-Salem, 85 F3d 178,183 (4th Cir. 1996) (reading Heck
as not altering general rule that warrantless arrest claim accrues at time of arrest).
113. The Third Circuit itself has not applied footnote seven in this context. See Montgom-
cry v. Do Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that Heck did not contemplate
claims of false arrest and false imprisonment).
114. Compare Donahue v. Gavin, No. 98-1602,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2760, at *17 (ED.
Pa. Mar. 12, 1999) (stating that plaintiff can bring Fourth Amendment claim immediately) with
Dunyan v. Paoloca, No. 91-2095, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9892, at *9 (ED. Pa. July 7, 1998)
(requiring that plaintiff show favorable termination before civil claim can proceed). One Eastern
District of Pennsylvania judge plainly denied the general exception rationale: "The Supreme
Court in Heck did not categorically exempt unreasonable search claims from the invalidation
requirement The Court noted that such a claim 'may lie' and posited circumstances in which
the success of such a claim would not necessarily impugn a plaintiff's conviction." Shelton v.
Macey, 883 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (ED. Pa. 1995). That districtjudge did not believe the Heck
opinion left any room for doubt, calling its mandate to district courts "exact and unequivocal."
Id. Some other Third Circuit district court decisions follow the individualized approach. See
Dunyan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9892, at *8-*9 (concluding plaintiff's claims, including
unlawful search, to be not cognizable because each was "closely connected with his arrst, trial,
and conviction").
In contrast, other Third Circuit district court decisions have adopted the general exception
approach. One court explicitly adopted the Seventh Circuit's precedents: "Like the Seventh
Circuit, I read [footnote seven's] language to hold that a claim based on an unlawful search or
seizure may be brought immediately, since a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not
necessarily impugn the validity of a conviction." Donahue, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2760, at *17
(citing Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551,553 (7th Cir. 1998); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F3d 134,
136 (7th Cir. 1995); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n.1 (I1th Cir. 1995)); see alsoDonahue,
1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2760, at *18-*19 (stating that claim for illegal search and seizure accrues
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Neither the First and District of Columbia Circuits nor their district courts have
meaningfully addressed the question. s The Supreme Court declined to re-
verse at least two decisions that supportthe individualized approach in the con-
text of illegal search claims,1 6 butthe Court also denied certiorarito a case that
applied the general exception approach to an analogous false arrest claim.11'7
A. Rome andAvignon: The Footnote Seven Schism"
The division among the circuit courts stems from two distinct modes of
analyzing footnote seven. The courts that support immediate accrual of search
at time of alleged violation). The other district court decisions following this approach utilized
similar analyses. See White v. Dunleavy, No. 97-3184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214, at *2-*3
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 13,1998) ("Conceivably, despite [plaintiff's] conviction, he is not foreclosed from
asserting the illegality of his arrest."); Wilmore v. Brennan, No. 94-7487,1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS
17289, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1995) (magistrate judge's report and recommendation)
(assuming without deciding that plaintiff's claim fell within footnote seven), adopted by district
judge, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17008 (ED. Pa. Nov. 13,1995). Butsee White, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS, at *3 (noting that such claim "would be hard pressed to succeed"). The Third Circuit has
yet to resolve this dispute, and the various district court decisions are staggered chronologically,
so one cannot discern any trend in a particular direction. See generally Donahue, 1999 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 2760 (decided Mar. 12, 1999) (employing general exception approach); Dunyan,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9892 (decided July 7, 1998) (using individualized approach); White,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214 (decided Jan. 13, 1998) (employing general exception approach);
Wilmore, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17289 (decided Sept. 12,1995) (employing general exception
approach); Shelton, 883 F. Supp. 1047 (decided May 5,1995) (using individualized approach).
115. See Scott v. Wellesley Police Dep't, No. 98-1280,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26092, at
*2-*3 (Ist Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (declining to discuss application of Heck to plaintiffs claims).
The court acknowledged but did not address Heck, instead jumping to the merits to affirm the
trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's illegal search and seizure § 1983 claims: "to the extent they
are not [already] barred under Heck v. Humphrey, plaintiff's claims each fail on the merits."
Id. at *2; see also Johnson v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, No. 97-0094, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18857, at "I-'2 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 1999) (stating that court previously considered and rejected
defense that plaintiff's illegal search claim was Heck-barred, but not stating whether court based
that decision on general exception or individualized approach); Aleotti v. Baars, 896 F. Supp.
1, 7 (D.D.C. 1995) (ruling that plaintiff's claims Heck-barred except illegal search claim against
single defendant whose actions were unrelated to those of all other defendants).
116. I will use the terms "case-by-case determination" and "individualized approach" inter-
changeably to describe the approach of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
117. See Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.) (using individualized ap-
proach), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999); Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545 (2d Cir.) (same),
cert denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995). But cf Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 1996)
(applying general exception approach to false arrest claim), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113 (1997).
118. From 1378 to 1431, the Catholic Church divided into competing pro-French and pro-
Italian factions, with dueling popes holding court at Avignon and Rome, plus a third faction's
brief rule from Pisa from 1409 to 1415. See BARBARA TUCHMAN, A DIsTANT MmROR: THE
CALAMITOUS 14THCMTURY320-339 (1978) (outlining origins of papal schism). Among many
unfortunate spiritual consequences, the schism resulted in each pope excommunicating the fol-
lowers of his rival. Id. See generally MARzlEHGAiL, THE THRE PoPES (1969) (discussing rival
papal factions and ultimate reunification).
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and seizure claims and thus embrace a general exception read footnote seven
quite literally: a hypothetical illegal search does not necessarily (or to an ab-
solute certainty) imply the invalidity of a conviction; therefore, all such claims
can proceed." 9 The ironic (or, cynically, results-oriented) outcome of this
approach is that because these courts allow immediate accrual of damages
claims, they also wind up dismissing otherwise meritorious § 1983 claims on
statute of limitations grounds at a much earlier date.120 Courts that oppose a
generalized exception read footnote seven within the overall context of the
Heck opinion: a claim should not proceed if the plaintiff can use the civil
action as a vehicle for collateral attack against an outstanding conviction.
In order to analyze these competing approaches appropriately, one must
first appreciate the following principles that the Heck opinion advances: con-
sistency, finality, and federalism. The majority explicitly relied on the first two
principles as justification for the favorable termination requirement, having
"long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and [having]
generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack."' The Su-
preme Court's overarching concern is collateral attack of criminal convictions
via civil action. m
Furthermore, implicit in the Court's concern that collateral attacks under-
mine consistency and finality is a healthy respect for federalism." The Court
has evinced a particular deference to states in the area of criminal law, espe-
cially in the context of pending criminal proceedings.'24 An example of this
119. See Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646,649 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hatwe need
to know under Heck [is] that we cannot say with certainty that success on Copus' § 1983 claim
'necessarily' would impugn the validity of his conviction.").
120. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999)
(ruling Heck never barred plaintiff's illegal search claim, making that claim stale under statute
of limitations); Booker, 94 F.3d at 1057 (dismissing claim for illegal search and seizure of
evidence, on which state appellate court based its reversal of plaintiff's conviction, due to
plaintiff's failure to bring civil case within two-year statute of limitations); Franklin v. Sum-
mers, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29997, at *3 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994) (dismissing illegal search
claim of incarcerated plaintiff as time-barred).
121. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,484-85 (1994) (citations omitted).
122. See id. at 486 ("[Tihe hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehic-
les for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages
actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or con-
finement.. .. ").
123. Of course, federalism is only a relevant concern in § 1983 actions, not Bivens actions.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (ruling that plaintiff was entitled to claim damages from federal agents who violated his
Fourth Amendment rights).
124. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (noting "national policy forbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circum-
stances").
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deference appears in Younger v. Harris," in which the Court held that fed-
eral courts ordinarily could not enjoin a state prosecution even under what
may be a facially unconstitutional law."6 The Court also has deferred to state
courts when interpreting § 1983 claims,1 7 albeit to a lesser extent when
dealing with damages.s The Court's Heckrequirementthat a § 1983 plaintiff
either show favorable termination or show that his suit does not imply the
invalidity of his conviction is entirely consistent with the Younger notion of
"Our Federalism."1 29
125. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
126. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (refusing to enjoin state prosecution).
In Younger, Harris faced charges of violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act Id. at 38.
Harris sought an injunction in federal court against Younger, the district attorney, to prevent the
prosecution on the grounds that the law suppressed Harris's free speech and free press rights.
Id. at 39. The federal district court found that it possessed jurisdiction and granted the injunc-
tion, ruling that the state lawwas void for vagueness. Id at 40. Examining precedent, the Court
stated that plaintiffs seeking to enjoin state prosecutions must show not only irreparable injury,
the general standard for injunctions, but also must show that the irreparable injury is "both great
and immediate," beyond the mere expense of defending the criminal charges. Id. at 46. The
Court noted that Harris would have an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims
during his criminal defense, and that Harris suggested no bad faith on the part of the prosecutor.
Id. at 49. The Court stated that the "chilling effect" that Harris claimed was insufficient to justify
federal interference in the execution of state laws via a facial challenge to a statute. Id. at 51.
The Court held that "the possible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face' does not in itself
justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and ... Harris has failed to make
any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief." Id. at 54. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, concurred
in the result, noting that the other appellees, who did not face prosecution, had no live contro-
versy against the state of California. Id. at 57-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas
dissented, arguing that federal intervention was permissible "where for any reason the state
statute being enforced is unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. Cf. Will V. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) (refusing to read
§ 1983 as including state within meaning of"person" in statute).
128. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193,202(1988) ("[E]ven ifthe Younger doctrine
requires abstention here, the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay
claims for monetary reliefthat cannot be redressed in the state proceeding.")
129. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. The Younger Court described this principle as follows:
[T]he notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, [is] a recogni-
tion of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state gov-
ernments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate func-
tions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to
describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to
respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The
concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts .... What the concept does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and
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Despite the limitations that these structural concerns impose, however,
the Heck opinion does have some advantages for the § 1983 plaintiff. By
initially denying accrual to a claim that would imply the invalidity of the
plaintiffs conviction, the Court allows the plaintiff to focus properly on
contesting the criminal charges at trial or on appeal - in other words, securing
his freedom before securing his expenses. 13 ° Assuming that this opportunity
makes the litigant at least marginally more likely to gain some form of favor-
able termination, the § 1983 plaintiff then may point to the favorable decision
on the illegality of the government action,' 3 ' which often leaves solely immu-
nity issues for the parties to litigate.'32 Of course, this situation presents a
double-edged sword, as an unfavorable state ruling on suppression also could
have a preclusive effect. 33 Although a challenge via habeas corpus, which
does not give preclusive effect to state court decisions,134 could rescue the
§ 1983 claim, habeas usually is not available as a remedy to Fourth Amend-
ment claimants. 135 In sum, at least on its face, Heck gives an incarcerated or
in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id.
130. See Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that to force
§ 1983 plaintiff to contest civil and criminal claims simultaneously would "misdirect" criminal
defendants).
131. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-101 (1980) (stating that despite § 1983's
alteration of federal-state relations, nothing in legislative history suggests § 1983 repealed issue
preclusion/collateral estoppel); id. at 103-04 (stating that litigation of federal constitutional
issue in state court will preclude relitigation of same issue in § 1983 action).
132. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,480 n.2 (1994) (noting state law determines
res judicata effect of state court decisions in § 1983 actions (citation omitted)). But see id. at
488 ('Thile we have no occasion to rule on the matter at this time, it is at least plain that
preclusion will not necessarily be an automatic, or even a permissible, effect"); Woods v.
Candela, 921 F. Supp. 1140, 1143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling collateral estoppel on issue of
illegality of search to be inappropriate because state appellate court reversed plaintiff's convic-
tion on basis of stricter New York search and seizure protections rather than Fourth Amend-
ment, which was basis for § 1983 claim).
133. See Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093,1095 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding issue preclu-
sion barred plaintiff's claims because they were argued and decided at state suppression heari-
ng); f Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 (11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claim due to Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, by which parties may not litigate "federal issues that are raised in state pro-
ceedings and [are] inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment" (internal quotations
omitted)).
134. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,497 (1973) ("[A] state prisoner ... who has
been denied relief in the state courts is not precluded from seeking habeas relief on the same
claims in federal court.").
135. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976) ("[W]here the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not
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potentially incarcerated § 1983 plaintiff the incentive and ability to focus on
his challenge of his conviction via direct appeal or via habeas corpus, when
available, before proceeding in civil court. As we shall see, however, not all
courts promote these values in the adjudication of footnote seven claims.
B. Courts.Permitting Accrual ofDamages Suits for Illegal
Search and Seizure
1. Seventh Circuit: Rigid Reading of"Necessarily"
The Seventh Circuit's prolific body of footnote seven appellate cases
staunchly supports the general exception interpretation of footnote seven even
beyond the search-and-seizure context. 36 Copus v. City of Edgerton 37 is an
illustrative search and seizure case.1 31 In Copus, the plaintiff, after a convic-
tion based on federal weapons charges, sued the local police officers who
located the weapons in a search while responding to a domestic disturbance
at the plaintiffs house. 39 The court admitted the ambiguity of footnote seven:
AtfirstblushthisfootnoteinHeckisabitunclear. Ontheonehand, itcould
meanthatsomeFourthAmendmentclaimsbroughtunder § 1983 wouldnot
necessarlybebarredftherecordrevealedthetaintedevidenceusedagainst
the plaintiff at the criminal trial would have been admitted anyway (e.g.,
under a theory of inevitable discovery). In that case the district court pre-
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.").
136. See, e.g., Blanck v. Hobson, No. 98-2993,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11093, at *8 (7th
Cir. Feb. 24, 2000) (stating that footnote seven exempts unreasonable search and seizure claim
from Heck requirements); Copus v. City ofEdgerton, 151 F.3d 646,648 (7th Cir. 1998) (same);
Franklin v. Summers, No. 93-2939, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29997, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 24,
1994) (stating that Fourth Amendment claims do not impugn validity of conviction); of Gon-
zales v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that footnote seven exempts un-
lawful arrest claim); Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that footnote
seven does not exempt unlawful post-arrest detention claim, unlike unreasonable search and
seizure claim); Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052,1056 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Simpson v. Rowan,
73 F.3d 134,136 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that footnote seven exempts unlawful arrest claim).
137. 151 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1998).
138. See Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F3d 646,647 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing Copus's
§ 1983 claims). In Copus, police seized numerous illegal weapons in plaintiff's residence during
an investigation of a domestic disturbance. Id. at 647. After conviction on federal weapons
charges, Copus sued the investigating police officers under § 1983 for an illegal search. Id. The
district court dismissed Copus's claim as necessarily calling into question his conviction. Id. at
64748. The Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that footnote seven generally exempts Fourth
Amendment claims from Heck's requirements. IM at 648-49. The court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Copus's probation officer from the civil suit, ruling that parole and probation
officers enjoyed absolute immunity for filing an arrest warrant as long as they do not gather the
evidence on which the warrant is based. IM at 649-50.
139. Id at 647.
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sumably would have to determine whether the record supported such a
theory. OntheotherhandthefootnotemightmeanthatFourthAmendment
claims forunlawfiu searches orarests do notnecessarilyimplya conviction
is invalid, so in all cases these claims can go forward."4
The court chose the latter reading.141 The court then extracted hypothetical
situations from the facts in the record to justify allowing Copus's suit to
proceed: the police may have discovered the weapons in the later search to
which Copus consented, or in the search that Copus's wife invited police to
undertake, or the government also may have convicted Copus based on
evidence seized legally in the days after the illegal search. 42 According to the
court, nothing beyond this speculation was necessary: "For our purposes, it
is enough that these possibilities exist, for they tell us what we need to know
under Heck - that we cannot say with certainty that success on Copus'[s]
§ 1983 claim 'necessarily' would impugn the validity of his conviction."'43
The focus on the word "necessarily" forms the basis of the Seventh
Circuit's vast footnote sevenjurisprudence. The Seventh Circuit would allow
immediate accrual of a § 1983 illegal search action even when the record
clearly demonstrated that the prosecutor possessed no other incriminating evi-
dence aside from that which police illegally seized and a judge ultimately ex-
cluded. 44 The Seventh Circuit has referred to unlawful searches, warrantless
arrests, and excessive force as "official misconduct unrelated to legal pro-
cess, ' 45 a category of conduct in which "the unlawfulness of the plaintiff's
being confined pursuant to legal process [is not] an implicit or explicit ingre-
dient of [the plaintiff's] case."'' 46 Claims that fall within this category accrue
at the time of the unconstitutional conduct because valid and invalid arrests
140. Id. at 648.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 649.
143. Id.
144. Cf Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1056 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "a wrongful
arrest claim, like a number of other Fourth Amendment claims, does not inevitably undermine
a conviction"). The court went on to explain:
Although in this case the Illinois Appellate Court's conclusion that Booker's con-
fession was the inadmissible product of an unlawful arrest ultimately resulted in the
dismissal of murder charges against Booker, in many cases, the prosecutor will have
other witnesses or other evidence that will support a retrial. As it happens, hero the
prosecutor did not have such other evidence to produce against Booker. But there
is nothing necessary or inevitable about that result.
Id.
145. Antonelliv.Foster, 104 F3d 899,901 (7thCir. 1997).
146. Id. But see Snodderly v. R.U.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating that claims of false arrest pursuant to warrant can imply invalidity of convic-
tion, unlike claims of false warrantless arrest).
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do not directly correlate with valid and invalid convictions. 147 The Seventh
Circuit views Heck as only applicable to cases directly involving unlawful
confinemnent.1
4s
2. Tenth Circuit: Footnote Seven Merely Limits Damages
In Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Department,149 the Tenth Circuit
adopted the general exception approach. 5° The Beck court determined that
Beck's illegal search claim accrued at the time of the search, and thus the
statute of limitations barred the plaintiff from proceeding on the claim."' The
court relied on Seventh Circuit opinions and ruled that Heck did not affect the
timing of such claims.152 The court took issue with the Sixth Circuit's initial
147. See Franklin v. Summers, No. 93-2939,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29997, at *2 (7th Cir.
Oct. 24, 1994) ("An arrest without probable cause may be followed by a valid conviction; a
proper arrest may lead to an invalid conviction. Thus it is not necessary to have a conviction
set aside to pursue a claim under the fourth amendment" (citations omitted)). This conceptual-
ization of false arrests is not shared universally. See Puerta v. United States, No. 99-56172,
2001 WL 115021, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001) (stating that Heck barred plaintiff's false arrest
claim because it implied invalidity of conviction); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d
117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[I]n a case where the only evidence for conviction was obtained
pursuant to an arrest, recovery in a civil case based on false arrest would necessarily impugn any
conviction resulting from the use of that evidence.").
148. See Antonelli, 104 F.3d at 901 (stating that Heck is inapplicable to cases of "official
misconduct unrelated to legal process").
149. 195 F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 1999).
150. See Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999)
(ruling that Heck did not affect accrual of plaintiff's claims). In Beck, prosecutors dismissed
rape charges against the plaintiff, but based on the victim's testimony, the state revoked Beck's
probation and accelerated his sentence on a previous conviction. Id. at 556. While incarcer-
ated, Beck filed a pro se § 1983 action against the police department Id. The court of appeals
disagreed with the district court's determination that Heck barred all of plaintiff's claims such
that the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run. Id. at 557. Citing footnote seven, the
court ruled that Beck's false arrest and illegal search claims accrued at the time of the arrest.
Id. at 558. Accordingly, the statute oflimitations on those claims had expired. Id. at 559. The
court remanded Beck's case to determine when another ofBeck's claims, relating to the alleged
destruction of exculpatory evidence, actually accrued. Id. The court ruled that Beck's mali-
cious prosecution claim related to the rape charge could proceed, but the malicious prosecution
claims related to the probation revocation could not. Id. at 560. The court finally ruled that
Oklahoma's statute of limitations barred Beck's state-law claims. Id. at 560-61.
151. See id. at 558 (determining that statute of limitations barred illegal search and seizure
and false arrest claims).
152. See id. ("Heck does not affect the time these claims arose because ultimate success on
them would not necessarily question the validity of a conviction resulting from the rape charge
or his probation revocation." (citing Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134,136 (7th Cir. 1995))); id.
at 558 n.3 (disputing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of footnote seven (citing Gonzalez v. Entress,
133 F.3d 551,553-54 (7th Cir. 1998))). Butsee Brown v. Fettke, 2001 WL 237302, at *2 (10th
Cir. Mar. 9, 2001) (stating plaintiff's only possible constitutional injury was from police entry
into his house, which would imply invalidity of conviction).
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interpretation of footnote seven, namely, that the final sentence of the foot-
note 53 undercut earlier language in the footnote that suggested a general ex-
ception:
154
We donotagreethatthis statementundercutsthe Court's earlierexplanation
in this same footnote that success on a claim for an unreasonable search
wouldnotnecessanilyimplytheunlawfulness ofthe conviction. Wereadthe
Court's latter statementas onlylimitingthe damages aplaintiffmayrecover
in such a case - the damages cannot include those forbeing convicted and
imprisoned, at least not until the conviction has been overturned.Y5
The Tenth Circuit did allow Beck's other malicious-prosecution-style claims
to proceed because they did not accrue under Heck until Beck demonstrated
favorable termination.156
3. Eighth Circuit: Footnote Seven and the Fifth Amendment
Courts have analyzed footnote seven to decide claims that fall outside of
the Fourth Amendment. In Simmons v. O'Brien,5' the Eighth Circuit anal-
ogized footnote seven's discussion of search claims to a § 1983 suit in which
Simmons sought damages for a coerced confession.' Simmons alleged that
153. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 n.7 (1994) ("In orderto recover compensa-
tory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful,
but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today, does not encompass
the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned)."
(emphasis in original)).
154. See id. ("[S]uch a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that
the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful").
155. Beck, 195 F3d at 558 n.3; see also Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir.
1995) (refusing to interpret footnote seven as creating general Fourth Amendment exception);
infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text (discussing Schilling).
156. See Beck, 195 F.3d at 560 (ruling statute of limitations did not bar Beck's claims
related to rape charge).
157. 77 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 1996).
158. See Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Sim-
mons's claim had accrued). In Simmons, police arrested plaintiff for the murder of his girl-
friend's mother and the theft of her car. Id. at 1094. After his conviction, Simmons alleged that
the police coerced his confession through use of excessive force and raciat slurs:
Specifically, Simmons contends that he was choked several times, kicked in the
stomach, and punched in the face; that pins were continually stuck in his hands
until he confessed; and that, when he would not confess, one officer threatened to
"take this nigger somewhere in (sio) kill him." Further, Simmons maintains that the
police repeatedly referred to him as "nigger" and that they told him they were tying
to coerce his confession solely because he is an African-American.
Id. The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Heck barred the civil suit
until Simmons won a habeas petition. Id The Eighth Circuit examined Heck, including foot-
note seven, and determined that the "reasoning should be extended to Fifth Amendment claims
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police illegally obtained his murder confession through the use of excessive
force and racial intimidation.159 The trial court dismissed his civil suit as
Heck-barred unless and until Simmons later successfully won a habeas peti-
tion."e° On appeal, the Eighth Circuit examined footnote seven of Heck and
determined that harmless error analysis applied to Fifth Amendment confes-
sion challenges as well as to Fourth Amendment evidence challenges."6 On
the grounds that even an involuntary confession possibly might be admitted
at trial under these circumstances, the court ruled that Simmons's claim had
accrued because it would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his convic-
tion. 62 The Eighth Circuit utilized footnote seven to create a generalized
exception for Fifth Amendment coercion claims, so it is no surprise that the
court found an identical exception for seizure claims in later cases."6
challenging the voluntariness of confessions." Id. at 1095. The court quoted from Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,310 (1991), in which the Supreme Court determined that harmless
error analysis applied to Fifth Amendment coerced confession challenges in much the same way
as Fourth Amendment violations. Simmons, 77 F.3d at 1095. The Eighth Circuit then stated,
in the fashion of a general exception to Heck, that Simmons's claims had accrued because
harmless error analysis might apply to the confession. Id. However, the court then determined
that Simmons already litigated the excessive force and racial slurs claims in the state proceed-
ings and thus was collaterally estopped from litigating those same claims if he received a "full
and fair hearing" on those claims. Id. at 1095-96. Examining the record, the court determined
that issue preclusion did estop Simmons's § 1983 action. Id. at 1096-97.
159. See id. at 1094 (outlining specific allegations against police).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1095 (stating that evidentiary impact of involuntary confession is indistin-
guishable from that of illegally seized evidence (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
310 (1991))).
162. Id.
163. See Whitmore v. Harrington, 204 F3d 784, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2000) (determining suc-
cessful "unlawful-investigative-stop" claim would not necessarily imply invalidity of unspeci-
fied conviction); Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (determining success-
ful unlawful seizure claim would not necessarily imply invalidity of drug possession convic-
tion). Admittedly, these two cases are "seizure" cases in the personal detention sense and not
in the obtaining evidence sense with which this Note is primarily concerned. However, given
the general thrust of these cases, there should be little doubt about how the Eighth Circuit would
rule on a true illegal-search-and-seizure claim. Curiously, though, one district court ruled that
Heck barred a plaintiff's unlawful search suit. See Rice v. Barnes, 966 F. Supp. 890, 897 (W.D.
Mo. 1997) (ruling that permitting claim alleging officer lied to judge to obtain seaich warrant
"would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on Plaintiff's conviction underHeck because
the Plaintiff has failed to place any evidence before the Court that his guilty plea to the charge
of Sale of a Controlled Substance has been reversed or otherwise called into question"). The
Rice court did not cite Simmons's footnote seven analysis, but instead cited a district court case
from the Second Circuit, which has taken the restrictive approach to footnote seven. See id.
(ordering dismissal of claim of allegedly invalid search warrant (citing Berman v. Turccki, 885
F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))). This appears to be merely an anomaly, and the district
court decision did precede the two appellate decisions closely on point
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In sum, the logic of the Simmons decision is identical to the Seventh
Circuit's analysis of footnote seven as applied to illegal search claims - the
mere hypothetical possibility of one of the footnote seven exceptions allows
for claim accrual." I take no issue with the Eighth Circuit's treatment of an
involuntary confession claim as analytically similar to a Fourth Amendment
claim. Consequently, once a court adopts the general exception approach,
extension of the scope of the exception to include § 1983 claims under the
Fiflh Amendment is analytically consistent. To paraphrase Bugs Bunny, how-
ever, that first step in the analysis is a lulu. 65
4. Ruminations on a General Exception
The general exception approach does have certain merits: First, the ap-
proach is consistent with the historical, pre-Heck understanding that common-
law claims such as false arrest and illegal search accrue at the time of the
illegal conduct."6 Second, the general exception approach may advance judi-
cial economy - courts need only glance at the particular style of the claims at
issue, and do not have to examine the record to determine whetherthe particu-
lar plaintiffs claims will invalidate his conviction. Furthermore, with the
limitations period beginning and ending earlier, conceivably fewer plaintiffs
will be eligible to pursue these § 1983 claims. However, the "race to the
courthouse" that the general exception approach generates will negate much
of this judicial economy.
The problem with the general exception approach is that it does not ade-
quately account forthe values implicit intheHeck opinion. The Supreme Court
indicated its desire to avoid "parallel litigation" dueto a "strong judicial policy
against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or
identicaltransaction."167 A party who simultaneously must litigate the validity
164. See Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646,649 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing accrual
of illegal search claim because "it is enough that these possibilities [of an exception in footnote
seven] exist").
165. The actual quotation is: "Watch out for that first step, Mac, it's a lulu." Audio avail-
able at http'/www.magpage.com/-smsmiti/wavelooneytunes/bug/lststep.wav (last visited
Oct 9,2001).
166. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting
historical rule that plaintiff claiming unlawful warrantless arrest should know nature of injury
and identity of tortfeasor on day of arrest (citations omitted)); Franklin v. Summers, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29997, at *2-*3 (7th Cir. Oct 6,1994) (stating reversal of conviction unnecessary
to pursue Fourth Amendment claim (citing Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983); Smith v.
Springer, 859 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1988)); Woods v. Candela, 825 F. Supp. 43, 45 (SD.N.Y.
1993) (identifying Second Circuit precedent that Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims accrue
at time of illegal conduct).
167. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,484 (1994) (quoting 8 STUART M. SPEISERBT AL.,
AMEICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, at 24 (1991)).
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of a search in a state suppression hearing while instituting a federal civil rights
suit regarding that same search potentially violates the Court's principles of
consistency and finality."6 The general exception also ignores federalism
because this approach allows the plaintiffto file a federal civil collateral chal-
lenge to a state ruling, although abstention may limit this result.'69 Finally,
subsequenttoHeek, amajority ofthe Court expanded the availability of§ 1983
damages by withdrawing the application of Heck's requirements to plaintiffs
who already have completed their sentences. This modification would be
nothing more than a hollow promise if the statute of limitations barred the
claims of this new class of eligible plaintiffs."' Admittedly, however, the
federalism and finality concerns ofthe Heck Court are the most important.
Curiously, at least one court that followed the general exception approach
recognized this great potential for federal-state tension, but that court ad-
dressed the problem by staying, rather than dismissing, the § 1983 action of
a plaintiff whose criminal appeals were pending.' Applying Younger and its
progeny literally, this was a justifiable result.'72 Yet the result begs the ques-
tion: if a court must stay a civil suit anyway to avoid tension with a state
criminal proceeding, then why force a § 1983 plaintiff to file early under a
rule of immediate accrual? By reading the entire Heck opinion rather than
extracting one word ("necessarily") from a footnote, courts could reach the
same practical result (initial refusal to hear the § 1983 action absent favorable
termination or a plaintiff's demonstration that one of the footnote seven
exceptions applies) and preserve the same values (consistency, finality, and
168. See id. at 485 (expressing "concerns for finality and consistency").
169. See id. at 487 n.8 (noting abstention as potential additional bar to accrual even of
claim not implying invalidity of conviction or sentence). The Court explained:
I]f a state criminal defendant brings a federal civil-rights lawsuit during the pen-
dency of his criminal trial, appeal, or state habeas action, abstention may be an
appropriate response to the parallel state-court proceedings. Moreover, we do not
decide whether abstention might be appropriate in cases where a state prisoner
brings a § 1983 damages suit raising an issue that also could be grounds for relief
in a state-court challenge to his conviction or sentence.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring) (joined by
O'Connor, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.3.) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that Heck would bar relief
without favorable termination and therefore habeas claim could not be moot); id. at 21-22
(Ginsburg, 3., concurring) (same); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice
Souter's rationale).
171. See Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1995) (determining that plaintiff's
claim accrued under Heck, but ordering Younger stay of plaintiff's damages claim while crim-
inal appeal was pending).
172. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (stating that court abstaining on
Younger grounds should stay rather than dismiss damages action when damages are unavailable
as remedy in state criminal proceedings).
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avoidance of federal-state tension), without prematurely eliminating from
consideration on statute of limitations grounds a group of plaintiffs with meri-
torious § 1983 claims." 3 Recognizing this, one circuit modified the general
exception to at least partially account for these problems.
5. Fourth Circuit: Rebuttable Presumption of a General Exception
The Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the illegal search issue, but
one analogous decision points to a modified general exception approach. In
brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,174 the Fourth Circuit examined Heck to con-
sider the accrual of a similar claim, false arrest."5 The court did not frame its
opinion in the absolute language of a general exception; however, the court
[did] not read Heck as altering the general rule that a § 1983 claim seeking
damages for an allegedlyunconstitutional warrantless arrest accrues when
the plaintiffknows or should know ofthe injury-except in the limited cir-
cumstances, not present here, when a § 1983 plaintiff's success on a claim
that a warrantless arrest was not supported by probable cause necessarily
would implicate the validity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence.176
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have dealt with the specific illegal
search issue in different ways. One pre-Brooks decision followed the general
exception approach.17 Another post-Brooks decision, affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit, denied accrual to a claim filed concurrently with criminal proceedings
because of the connection between the search and the prosecution. 1 s Al-
though the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the illegal search issue,
173. See Shamacizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that
requiring plaintiffs to file civil actions from which courts would have to abstain "misdirect[s]
the criminal defendant").
174. 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996).
175. See Brooks v. City ofWinston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178,182-83 (4th Cir. 1996) (determin-
ing that § 1983 claim for damages for warrantless arrest accrues at time of injury). In Brooks,
prosecutors dismissed charges of kidnapping and rape against the plaintiff. Id. at 180. Brooks
sued a police officer for various constitutional violations and sued the city for inadequate training
and supervision. Id. The court determined that Brooks knew or should have known of his injury
on the day of the allegedly warrantless arrest, and thus the statute of limitations had run on
Brooks's claims. Id: at 182. To the extent that Brooks alleged an arrest pursuant to a warrant
unsupported by probable cause, the court determined that such a claim was not time-barred. Id.
at 183. The court then ruled that Brooks's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for legal
process issued without probable cause. Id. The court concluded that Brooks failed to state a
claim for his continued detention after a magistrate's determination of probable cause. Id. at 184.
176. Id. at 183.
177. See Snyder v. City ofAlexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672,687 (E.D. Va. 1994) (dismissing
illegal search claim as time-barred due to accrual at time of search).
178. See Bear v. Wydra, 48 F. Supp. 2d 516,519 (W.D.N.C. 1999) ("Plaintiffs' claims nec-
essarily would implicate the validity of the pending criminal proceedings against them and there-
fore are not ripe for review."), a ffd, 194 F.3d 1303 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
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the Brooks opinion suggests that neither district court decision squares exactly
with the likely appellate outcome. 179
The approach that the Brooks decision suggests lies somewhere between
the competing approaches of the two groups of circuit courts. The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged the possibility that some claims within the illegal search
category could imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction, an idea that
the Seventh Circuit rejects.18° A separate footnote in the Heck opinion ac-
knowledged at least this much, positing the example of a false arrest claimthat,
although perhaps theoretically unrelatedto a conviction for resisting arrest, still
would practicallyundermine that conviction." Instead ofrequiring a showing
of favorable termination or other case-by-case determination before accrual,
however, the Brooks language shifts the presumption in favor of immediate
accrual." In acknowledging that at least some Fourth Amendment claims
could imply the invalidity of a conviction, the Fourth Circuit's approach is less
objectionable than the pure general exception approach. Still, because the
Brooks opinion shifts the presumption in favor of immediate accrual, thereby
imposing on civil defendants the burden of proving that the civil suit would
collaterally attack the conviction, even this tamer general exception approach
threatens the consistency, finality, and federalism values that the Heck opinion
trumpets.
83
C. Courts DenyingAccrual ofDamages Suits for Illegal Search and Seizure
1. The Sixth Circuit: "The Seventh Circuit Misreads Heck'
8 4
The Sixth Circuit first addressed § 1983 claims for Fourth Amendment
violations in Schilling v. White.' 5 Schilling challenged a post-traffic-accident
179. See Brooks, 85 F.3d at 183 (identifying "general rule" of immediate accrual, but ac-
knowledging "limited circumstances" in which civil claim would imply invalidity of criminal
conviction).
180. Compare id. (acknowledging "limited circumstances" when false arrest would imply
invalidity of conviction) with Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A]
search can be unlawful but the conviction entirely proper, or the reverse, and... come injury
from a violation of the fourth amendment is unrelated to conviction.").
181. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 n.6 (1994) (stating that § 1983 plaintiff
claiming false arrest would negate element of offense ofresisting arrest).
182. Compare Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing "general rule" of immediate accrual) with Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008,1015 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("[A] § 1983 action alleging illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which
criminal charges are based does not accrue until the criminal charges have been dismissed or
the conviction has been overturned.").
183. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 485 (discussing concerns of consistency and finality).
184. Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081,1086(6th Cir. 1995).
185. 58 F3d 1081 (6th Cir. 1995). In Schilling, police officers responding to a traffic
accident searched Schilling's car and person for drugs, then charged Schilling with driving under
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search of his car and person that led to a subsequent conviction for driving
under the influence of drugs. 86 The federal district court dismissed Schil-
ling's § 1983 suit without prejudice until a court of competent jurisdiction set
aside the conviction."' Extensive Sixth Circuit precedent exempted Fourth
Amendment damages claims from the normal state exhaustion requirenent.1 88
The Sixth Circuit, however, ruled that the exception did not survive Heck."8 9
The appellate court strongly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's reading of
a categorical exception into footnote seven.l" Under the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation, "[tihe fact that a Fourth Amendment violation may not neces-
sarily cause an illegal conviction does not lessen the requirement that a
plaintiff show that a conviction was invalid as an element of constitutional
injury."9' The court stated that the Supreme Court
explicitly foreclosed [the general exception] line of reasoning in Heck,
when it concluded that because an illegal seizure does not automatically
render a conviction invalid, an illegal seizure does not alone create an
injury compensable under § 1983 .... The language of Heck plainly
the influence. Id. at 1082-83. The court outlined various precedents, most notably Feaster v.
Miksch, 846 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir. 1988), which exempted Fourth Amendment damages claims
from normal habeas corpus exhaustion requirements. Schiing 58 F.3d at 1085. In light of
Heck, however, the court determined that the Feaster exception was no longer good law. Id The
court recognized the Seventh Circuit's adoption of the footnote seven exception in Franklin v.
Summers, No. 93-2939,1994 WL 5854802, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 24,1994) ("Claims under the
fourth amendment do not impeach the validity of a conviction.") (emphasis added), but deter-
mined that "[tlhe Seventh Circuit misreads Heck." Schilling, 58 F.3d at 1086. Examining
footnote seven for itself, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's language "plainly refutes"
the idea that Fourth Amendment claims are exempt categorically from Heck. Id. The court also
rejected Schilling's claim that the dismissal of his claim deprived him of a right to a federal
forum on the grounds that, under Heck, Schiling had no legitimate legal claim requiring such
a forum. I at 1087.
186. See id. at 1082-83 (oudining factual background of case).
187. Id. at 1083.
188. See id. at 1085 (examining precedents exempting Fourth Amendment claims (citing
Lumpkin v. Wilkinson, No. 93-4060,1994 WL 105889, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28,1994); Turner
v. Leis, No. 89-3877,1990 WL 6950, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 1,1990); Goddard v. Larson, No. 89-
5612, 1989 WL 144341, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 30,1989); Sherrils v. Kerek, No. 884153,1989
WL 34834, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 4,1989); Powell v. Gilbert, No. 88-1067,1988 WL 76542, at
*1 (6th Cir. July 22,1988))).
189. See it (holding that "any exception is no longer good law"); id. at 1086 ("Put simply,
the common-law-based rationale in Heck completely undercuts the reasoning reflected in
[earlier Sixth Circuit precedents], and eliminates the exceptions carved out in those decisions.').
190. See id. at 1086 ("The Seventh Circuit misreads Heck.").
191. IM (emphasis in original). Notably, the Schilling determination that "Heck applies
as much to prisoners in custody... as to persons no longer incarcerated" is no longer good law.
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 19 (1998) (Souter, 3., concurring) (stating that "Heck did
not hold that a released prisoner in Spencer's circumstances is out of court on a § 1983 claim")
(discussed supra note 98).
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refiitestheargumentthatFourthAmendmentclaimsa exemptedfromthe
requirement that a conviction must be set aside as a precondition for this
type of § 1983 suit.L2
The Sixth Circuit dismissed Schilling's action because he failed to show the
invalidation of his conviction.)9
The Sixth Circuit extended Schilling in Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan 94 In
this case, police conductedthree warrantless searches of Shamaeizadeh's home
and found evidence of marijuana cultivation in the basement apartment that he
rented to others. 95 In Schilling, the court had dismissed the plaintiff's case for
failure to demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.a' In contrast, the
Cunigan court decided when the statute of limitations began to run for a plain-
tiff who was initially prosecuted but never convicted.'q The court determined
that a § 1983 action that would imply the invalidity of a firture conviction did
192. Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081,1086 (6th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 1087; see id. at 1087 n.5 (noting that if Schilling later were to have his convic-
tion invalidated, he might then file § 1983 action).
194. 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999). In Cunigan, police
responded to a burglary call, which Shamacizadeh's live-in girlfriend placed, and conducted a
warrantless search of the house. IM at 393. After detecting the smell of marijuana emanating
from the house, the police conducted two warrantless searches of the entire house, ultimately
finding 393 marijuana plants in the basement apartment that Shamaeizadeh rented to others. Id.
The district court found that exigent circumstances justified the first search, but excluded the
evidence from the second and third searches. IM The trial judge then ruled that without the
redacted evidence, the police affidavit did not support issuance of a search warrant for both levels
of the house. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id.; see United States v. Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d
1131, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of search warrant). After the government
dismissed the charges, Shamaeizadeh sued for damages under § 1983, but the district court
dismissed his action as untimely under Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations. Cunigan, 182
F3d at 394; see KY. RErV. STAT. ANN. § 413.140 (Mlichie 2000) (one-year statute oflinitations
for personal injuries). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Heck barred accrual of § 1983
claims related to potential convictions, as well as actual ones, meaning that a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a successful civil suit will not invalidate any future conviction, in addition to
present convictions. Cunigan, 182 .3d at 398. Because Shamacizadeh's potential for convic-
tion depended largely upon the seized evidence, the court ruled that the statute of limitations on
his § 1983 claim did not begin to run until the state dismissed the charges. Id. at 398-99. The
court rejected the idea that the statute of limitations should begin to run at the time of the search,
with federal courts then staying the § 1983 claim until the conclusion ofthe criminal proceeding,
on the grounds that such a ruling would "misdirect' the criminal defendant away from pursuing
a viable defense to the charges against him. I at 399. Accordingly, the court held that
Shamaeizadeh filed a timely § 1983 claim. Id,
195. See Cunigan, 182 F3d at 393 (stating police seized 393 marijuana plants as well as
marijuana-growing equipment).
196. See Schilling, 58 F.3d at 1087 (dismissing § 1983 action for failure to demonstrate
invalidity of underlying conviction).
197. See Cunigan, 182 F3d at 396 ("[N]either Heck nor Schilling definitively resolves the
issue before us.").
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not accrue until the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed. 9r The court
then examined the record and stated that, prior to the conclusion ofthe criminal
case, no civil court could have decided whether the civil action would have
determined that invalidity.19 Ifthe criminal court ruled the search lawful and
then convicted Shamaeizadeh based on that evidence, Shamaeizadeh would
have no cause of action.e If the criminal court ruled the search unlawful but
admitted the evidence based on an exclusionary exception, then Shamaeizadeh
could not seek damages related to the criminal proceeding."' Either way,
the court concluded, disposition of the criminal case was necessary before
Shamaeizadeh could seek damages related to his conviction, so the date ofthe
dismissal of the criminal charges served as the starting point for the statute of
limitations period. 2 Accordingly, the court ruled that Shamaeizadeh filed a
timely § 1983 action.
203
The Sixth Circuit ruled in at least one case thattwo plaintiffs' § 1983 suit
for illegal search and seizure accrued at the time of the search and could pro-
ceed even while the plaintiffs were incarcerated.2°4 Because the allegedly
illegally-seized evidence was never the subject of criminal charges, the court
determined thatthe claim was distinct from Schilling and would not collaterally
challenge the plaintiffs' criminal proceedings.2° This is entirely consistent
with Schilling and Cunigan, however, in that the court required each plaintiff
to demonstrate that the civil claim would not overturn an actually or potentially
outstanding valid conviction.
Furthermore, this more recent ruling probably comports more closelythan
Schilling with the proper reading of footnote seven. Consider the following
hypothetical: Police spot a poorly disguised moonshine still in plain view in a
neighborhood park. They immediately search the .nearest house without a
warrant and find a closet full of incriminating Mason jars. They also find the
female homeowner engaging in what arguably constitutes sexual relations with
a young intern from her office. (The police report, quickly obtained by the
198. See id. at 397 (adopting Shamaeizadeh's argument that Heck and Schilling applied
equally to injuries suffered without conviction).
199. See id. at 398 (stating that district court could not have determined whether claim
would imply invalidity of conviction while criminal proceedings still pending).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 398-99.
203. See id. at 399 (reversing and remanding case to trial court).
204. See Brindley v. Best, 192 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[This issue was never
actually litigated in the state court criminal proceedings and therefore the plaintiffs were not
collaterally estopped from challenging the seizures in federal court").
205. See id. at 531 ("The defendants' reliance on Heck is misplaced because ... the alleged
unlawful seizures in this case would not invalidate the plaintiffs' convictions.").
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press, is quite thorough in its description of these circumstances.) A judge
excludes the mason jars for lack of probable cause, but the jury finds the
woman guilty of the relevant charges based on the still and testimony from the
mechanic at the local radiator repair shop. The woman's husband of several
years is not too concerned about the moonshine and the conviction, as he
himself descends from a long line of "white lightning" purveyors. He is sig-
nificantly more concerned about the presence of the strapping young intern -
he subsequently divorces his wife and subjects her to financial ruin in addition
to the media's public humiliation. The wife should have a viable claim against
the police for at least those damages, which stem from the illegal search but are
unrelated to the conviction.20° Under Schilling, the wife arguably would have
no claim as long as her conviction remained valid, even though the exclusion
of the evidence makes it impossible for the civil suit to collaterally attack the
conviction. °7 In light ofthe later Sixth Circuit interpretations, the court would
examine the wife's claim, determine that a successful suit would not imply the
invalidity of the conviction (because the evidence from the search never
appeared at trial), and would allow the claim to proceed, but would not do so
on any general exception basis."08
2. Second Circuit: First to Advocate Case-by-Case Determination
In Woods v. Candela,2"9 the Second Circuit became the first circuit court
to advance the individualized approach to footnote seven.21 Evidence ob-
206. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994) ("[I]fthe district court determines
that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstand-
ing criminal judgment against the plaintiff the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit" (footnotes omitted)).
207. See Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that no constitu-
tional injury exists until conviction is reversed).
208. See Brindley, 192 F.3d at 530-31 (determining that fact of plaintiff's § 1983 claim
would not imply invalidity of conviction).
209. 47 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1995).
210. See Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (Woods V)
(stating plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim implied invalidity of conviction), cert denied, 516
U.S. 808 (1995). In the Woods case, defendant trooper stopped Woods's car for excessive
window tint, then searched the vehicle and found items linking Woods to an armed robbery.
Woods v. Candela, 921 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Woods V). Woods was con-
victed of first-degree robbey, but a state appellate court overturned the conviction on the
grounds that the search was illegal. People v. Woods, 592 N.Y.S2d 748,750-52 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (Woods 1). The district court originally dismissed Woods's § 1983 damages claim
as barred by the statute of limitations. Woods v. Candela, 825 F. Supp. 43,49 (S.DN.Y. 1993)
(Woods R). The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Woods v. Candela, 13 F.3d 574, 576-
77 (2d Cir. 1994) (Woods Ml). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Heck. Woods v. Candela, 513 U.S. 801 (1994) (Woods M'. On remand, the Second
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tained in a search of Woods's car formed the basis for his conviction of first-
degree robbery." A state appellate court overturned Woods's conviction on
the grounds that the trooper conducted an illegal search of Woods's vehicle.212
The district court initially dismissedWoods's § 1983 claim on statute oflimita-
tions grounds,2 3 and the Second Circuit affirmed.214 On remand from the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Heck,"' the Second Circuit
determined that Woods had filed atimely suit because the § 1983 illegal search
claim directly implicated Woods's conviction.216 Because the state appellate
court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the officer had a lack of
probable cause to detain Woods and search his vehicle and because Woods's
§ 1983 claim alleged the exact same basis for civil recovery, the Second Circuit
ruled that Woods's civil claim, if filed earlier, would have implied the invalid-
ity of his conviction.217 The court's decision certainly was true to the princi-
ples of Heck- to allow the immediate accrual of Woods's suit, regarding the
very evidence on which he was convicted, would contradict the Court's "hoary
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the
validity of outstanding criminal judgments."
21
The Second Circuit has instructed district courts to make the "inherently
factual 219 determination of whether one ofthe doctrines identified in footnote
seven applies to evidence in a plaintiff's criminal case before dismissing a
§ 1983 claim as premature.' 0 This is precisely what the Heck decision
mandates.221 For example, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's sua
sponte dismissal of a § 1983 claim for damages from an illegal search and
Circuit ruled that the state appellate court's reversal of the conviction on the grounds that the
search was illegal meant that a § 1983 suit necessarily would have implied the invalidity of the
conviction. Woods V, 47 F.3d at 546. Accordingly, in light of Heck, the court determined that
Woods's cause of action did not accrue until the dismissal of his conviction. Id.
211. Woods VI, 921 F. Supp. at 1143.
212. Id.
213. Woods I, 825 F. Supp. at49.
214. Woods!I/', 13 F.3d at 576-77.
215. Woods IV, 513 U.S. at 801.
216. See Woods V, 47 F3d at 546 (ruling that plaintiff's § 1983 claims did not accrue
before date of appellate reversal of conviction).
217. Id.
218. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486 (1994).
219. Covington v. City ofNew York, 171 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999).
220. See Bourdon v. Vaceo, No. 99-0261, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11014, at *4 (2d Cir.
May 17, 2000) ("[I]is claims based on an alleged unreasonable search and seizure may not
implicate the invalidity of his conviction because there may be independent sources of evidence
against him or harmless error in admitting evidence obtained in that search.").
221. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 ("ITihe district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ....").
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seizure as Heck-barred.' District courts in the Second Circuit follow this
individualized approach.'
3. Ninth Circuit: Examining Heck's Objectives
In one of the more recent and thorough footnote seven appellate deci-
sions, Harvey v. Waldron, 4 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue for the first
time.1 A Montana Department of Revenue investigator and three Billings
City Police Department detectives entered William Harvey's antique business,
which was not yet open to the public, without a search warrant or invitation. 6
They seized numerous antique gaming devices that were no longer used for
gambling and charged Harvey with possession of illegal gaming devices. 7
The prosecutor dismissed the charges against Harvey, but not until after
donating the machines to the city without notice to Harvey, who then sought
damages under § 1983.' The viability of Harvey's claims depended on when
his cause of action accrued: if Heck would have barred his suit while the
criminal charges were pending, then Harvey would have filed a timely claim
under the statute of limitations; if Heck would have allowed the suit to pro-
222. See Bourdon, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11014, at *4-*5 ("[T]he district court improp-
erly dismissed the claims against the police officers at this stage in the litigation.").
223. See Dockery v. Tucker, No. 97-CV-3584 (ARR), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14908, at
*28 (E.D.N.Y. Oct 13,2000) (allowing Fourth Amendment claim to proceed because "the trial
court's apparent ruling that the search was made pursuant to a valid warrant and thus satisfied
the Fourth Amendment was not necessary to plaintiff's conviction").
224. 210 F3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000).
225. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008,1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that issue was offirst
impression in circuit). In Harvey, an antique-store owner sued a Montana revenue agent and
three Billings police detectives under § 1983 for unlawfully seizing approximately twenty-five
antique gaming machines that were no longer used for gambling. Id. at 1010. Although the
county dismissed the charges against Harvey, the county previously had given away the devices.
Id. at 1011. The district court dismissed Harvey's claims on the grounds that the statute of
limitations had run. Id. at 1012. Examining the situation in light of Heck, the Ninth Circuit first
stated that Heck applied to "potential" convictions as well as "actual" ones. Id. at 1013-14. The
court then examined Harvey's search and seizure claim in light of footnote seven, reviewing the
competing rationales identified by the split circuits. Id. at 1015. Siding with the Second and
Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that footnote seven did not create a generalized exception
for illegal search and seizure damages suits and that such suits concerning seized evidence that
was essential to the underlying criminal prosecution did not accrue until favorable termination.
Id. at 1014-16. Accordingly, Harvey's suitwas nottime-barred. Id at 1016. For similar reasons,
the court also ruled that Harvey's claim for sale of property without due process was not time-
barred. Id. The Ninth Circuit previously acknowledged Heckwhen adjudicating the viability of
an illegal search claim under § 1983, but decided the case on non-Heck grounds. See Trimble v.
City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining claim was time-barred).
226. Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1010.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1011,1013.
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ceed, then the statute of limitations would have run already on Harvey's dam-
ages claim.?
The Ninth Circuit examined the circuit court split over footnote seven
and refused to read the footnote as creating a general exception for illegal
search and seizure claims,' ° thus agreeing with the interpretation of the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits:
Such a holding will avoid the potential for inconsistent determinations on
the legality of a search and seizure in the civil and criminal cases and will
therefore fulfill the Heck Court's objectives ofpreserving consistency and
finality, and preventing "a collateral attack on [a] conviction through the
vehicle of a civil suit.""l
Because the seized gaming devices constituted an essential element ofthe
charged crime, possession of illegal gaming devices, the court determined that
a successful § 1983 action that had been filed while the charges were pending
would have implicated the validity of the prosecution, making the civil action
not cognizable under Heck.?2 District courts in the Ninth Circuit have fol-
lowed the Harvey approach. 3
4. Fifth Circuit: Appearing to Support an Individualized Approach
The Fifth Circuit has not resolved many footnote seven issues, owing at
least in part to a doctrine in the circuit whereby courts determine immunity
questions before ruling on Heck accrual issues." However, in Mackey v.
Dickson,"5 the court ordered a case-by-case deternination similar to that of
the Second Circuit." Mackey had been incarcerated pursuant to an indict-
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1015.
231. Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,484-85 (1994)) (alteration in original).
232. Id. at 1015-16; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994) (requiring favorable
termination for any claim that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence).
233. See McRae v. Maia County Sheriff's Dep't, No. C 00-2712 TEH (PR), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14775, at *4 (ND. Cal. Oct. 3, 2000) (dismissing claim without prejudice to
refiling if conviction overturned); Simmons v. Davis, No. C 00-2272 WHA (PR), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10847, at *3 (ND. Cal. July 26, 2000) (ruling that plaintiff failed to state cogniza-
ble § 1983 claim absent showing of favorable termination).
234. See Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458,462 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (characteriz-
ing district court's dismissal on immunity grounds as "proper"); Littles v. Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that court should resolve
immunity issues before engaging in Heck analysis); Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F..3d 75,76 (5th Cir.
1995) (per curiam) (considering immunity as threshold matter).
235. 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995).
236. See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744,746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that
question of whether suit was Heck-barred was "premature"). In Mackey, the plaintiff sought
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ment, and his criminal trial had not yet commenced.2 7 The court decided that
the record was insufficient to determine whether a successful civil suit would
imply the invalidity of a potential conviction.' If prosecutors introduced no
evidence from the illegal search at his trial, then the illegal search would not
be inconsistent with his conviction2 39 If, however, the criminal jury convicted
Mackey based on evidence from the illegal search, then the damages claim
would directly challenge the validity of that conviction.'2
The circuit court ordered the district court to stay the civil suit until the
criminal proceedings concluded.241 Although the court ordered the stay on
Heck grounds, the result appears identical to that in which a court grants
accrual under Heck but orders a stay on abstention grounds.242 This is incon-
sistent with Heck - either the claim has accrued or it has not, and the burden
should lie with the plaintiff to demonstrate accrual.243 Rather than staying the
suit, the court should have remanded for an immediate determination of the
question.
In light of Mackey, one district court examined the circuit split and
determined that the Fift Circuit sided more closely with the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits.2' The court noted the "individualized approach" under-
taken in Mackey and examined the record to determine whether the evidence
obtained in the allegedly illegal search formed the basis for the plaintiff's
conviction.245 Concluding that prosecutors subsequently used the evidence in
the criminal proceedings, the court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for
failure to show favorable termination.2* Much like this district court, other
circuit courts have relied onMackey as persuasive authority supporting a case-
damages for an allegedly unlawful search and seizure. Id. at 745. The court examined Heck,
then stated that it could not yet determine whether Mackey's claim would imply the invalidity
of his conviction. Id: at 746. The court ordered the district court to stay the civil proceedings
until the conclusion of the pending criminal case. Id




241. See id. (ordering stay until conclusion of criminal proceedings because "until that time
it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the [civil and criminal cases]").
242. See Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1995) (ordering stay ofplaintiffs
Fourth Amendment claims until conclusion of state criminal appeals).
243. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994) (requiring plaintiffto demonstrate
favorable termination).
244. See Salts v. Moore, 107 F. Supp. 2d 732, 737 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (calling Mackey
approach "somewhat analogous" to approach of Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits).
245. Id.
246. See idi at 738 ("Salts' success in his claims against the Defendants would necessarily
draw into question the validity of his conviction or sentence.").
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by-case determination in footnote seven cases." At the very least, one cannotread the Fifth Circuit as supporting a general exception approach.248
5. The Case-by-Case Determination: Promoting the Principles of Heck
As the decisions from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits demon-
strate, the individualized approach is a superior interpretation of footnote
seven. First, consider once again the disputed language of the footnote:
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable
search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was
introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-
outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and
inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action,
even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's convic-
tion was unlawfiL
249
The first sentence utilizes permissive language ("may") rather than an
absolute term ("shall"). With the ambiguity of the second sentence, one can
at least argue that the phrase "such a § 1983 action" only describes illegal
search claims that feature one of the listed doctrines, not all illegal search
claims. Admittedly, an argument based solely on the text of the footnote does
not point to either camp very clearly. When read in the context of the overall
Heck opinion, though, the individualized approach becomes the more appro-
priate one.
The general exception does not allow for the possibility that success on
a § 1983 illegal search claim could implicate an underlying conviction."0 The
individualized approach recognizes that such a categorical analysis is theoreti-
cally cognizable but impractical. If a state appellate court reverses a convic-
tion because an invalid search produced the evidence on which the conviction
was based, then surely a § 1983 damages suit questioning that same search
would just as strongly implicate the conviction."1 If we take seriously the
247. See Harvey v. Waldron; 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Mackey v.
Dickson, 47 F-3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995), as supporting interpretations of Second and Sixth
Circuits); Shamacizadch v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391,395 (6th Cir. 1999) (same).
248. See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that accrual of
claim would depend on relationship between plaintiff's civil and criminal actions).
249. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (first and second emphasis added, third emphasis in orig-
inal) (citations omitted).
250. See Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646,648 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Fourth Amend-
ment claims for unlawful searches or arrests do not necessarily imply a conviction is invalid,
so in all cases these claims can go forward."); cf. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d
178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996) (identifying "general rule" of immediate accrual, but acknowledging
"limited circumstances" in which civil claim would imply invalidity of criminal conviction).
251. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008,1015-16(9th Cir. 2000) (statingthat evidence
from unlawful search was essential element of criminal charges against plaintiff); Shamaeizadch
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values of consistency, finality, and federalism that the Heck decision pro-
motes, 2 then a case-by-case determination errs appropriately on the side of
these values.1 3 Itis axiomatic that an unaccrued § 1983 claim has no possibil-
ity of aggravating federal-state tension by interfering in the state criminal
process.
Furthermore, the individualized approach promotes these values without
unduly sacrificing a plaintiff's ability to seek redress via § 1983 for a Fourth
Amendment violation. As noted previously, the general exception rule may
seem more plaintiff-friendly by allowing immediate accrual of § 1983 illegal
search claims, but the dark consequence is that plaintiffs in these courts face
expiration ofthe statute of limitations when the litigants more properly should
focus on defending themselves against the underlying criminal charges."
The Sixth Circuit rightfully criticized this tug-of-war on criminal defendants:
To require a defendantin a criminalproceedingto file a civil action raising
any potential § 1983 claims within one year ofany alleged illegal searches
or otherallegedviolations of constitutional rights, claims whichthefederal
court mustthen abstainfrom resolvinguntil the disposition ofthe criminal
proceedings, would misdirect the criminal defendant Surely, just as a
convicted prisoner must first seek relief through habeas corpus before his
§ 1983 action can accrue, so too should the defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding focus on his primary mode of relief- mounting a viable defense
to the charges against him-before turning to a civil claimunder § 1983.155
Under the individualized approach, only one particular type of § 1983
plaintiff needs to worry about concurrently filing his § 1983 action: one with
a reason to know (likely due to a ruling at a state pre-trial suppression hearing)
v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391,393 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that affidavit did not support probable
cause for issuance of search warrant once court redacted information obtained through earlier
illegal search); Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff's
§ 1983 claims rested on same grounds as criminal appeal and thus would have implied invalid-
ity of conviction).
252. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 485 (1994) (stating Court's concerns of
consistency, finality, hnd prevention of collateral attack).
253. See Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1015 (stating that approach of Second and Sixth Circuits
"will... fuifili the Heck Court's objectives of preserving consistency and finality, and prevent-
ing 'a collateral attack on [a] conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit'" (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
254. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999)
(ruling that Heck never barred plaintiff's illegal search claim, making that claim now stale under
statute of limitations); Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1057 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing claim
for illegally obtained confession, on which state appellate court based its reversal of plaintiff's
conviction, due to plaintiff's failure to bring civil case within two-year statute of limitations);
Franklin v. Summers, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29997, at *3 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994) (dismissing
illegal search claim of incarcerated plaintiff as time-barred).
255. Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 399.
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either that a footnote seven doctrine like inevitable discovery, independent
source, or harmless error applies to his case, or thatthe court will suppress the
evidence seized from the illegal search but still will proceed to trial based on
other evidence." 6 Any other plaintiff can, indeed must, challenge the search
via the criminal trial and appellate process before seeking the federal damages
remedy. 7
The contrast is clear: The courts utilizing the individualized approach
preserve the § 1983 actions ofplaintiffs who abide byHeck's values." s When
a general exception court dismisses the § 1983 claim of a plaintiff who pur-
sues his criminal remedies before filing the civil claim, the court effectively
punishes that plaintiff for respecting consistency, finality, and federalism. 9
This result of the general exception approach is hardly desirable given the
important remedial role of § 1983 damages in compensating victims of Fourth
Amendment violations and in regulating police conduct.2"°
V Conclusion
In § 1983, Congress has provided a federal remedy for constitutional
torts. 1 Victims of unconstitutional conduct, including Fourth Amendment
violations, can and should be able to recover damages.262  The Supreme
Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey generally has denied accrual to § 1983
256. See Brindley v. Best, 192 F.3d 525, 530-31 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing for accrual of
plaintiffs' claim because prosecutors never introduced evidence from illegal search at trial);
Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) ("If Mackey is tried and convicted and
in his contested criminal case no evidence is presented resulting directly or indirectly from any
of his arrests, it is difficult to see how any illegality in any of his arrests could be inconsistent
with his conviction.").
257. See Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 399 (determining that claim did not accrue until
charges against plaintiffwere dismissed).
258. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling that claim not
Heck-barred); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Woods v.
Candela, 47 F.3d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
259. See, e.g.,Beck, 195 F.3d at 558 (ruling that Heck never barred plaintiff's illegal search
claim, making that claim now stale under statute of limitations); Booker, 94 F3d at 1057 (dis-
missing claim for illegally obtained confession, on which state appellate court based its reversal
of plaintiff's conviction, due to plaintiff's failure to bring civil case within two-year statute of
limitations); Franklin, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29997, at *3 (dismissing illegal search claim of
incarcerated plaintiff as time-barred).
260. See supra Part R (discussing importance of damages remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing federal remedy against local officials' viola-'
tion of constitutional rights).
262. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,187 (1961) (concluding that plaintiff stated cause
of action against police for damages from Fourth Amendment violation); see also supra Part
1 (discussing importance of damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations).
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claims that implicate the validity ofthe underlying convictions.263 In so doing,
the Court clearly expressed its desire to account for values of consistency and
finality, plus the corollary value of federalism, in § 1983 actions.2" The
counter-example the Court provided in footnote seven, offering an illegal
search claim as one that might not imply the invalidity of the conviction,
makes perfect sense as an illustration: cases involving the doctrines of inevit-
able discovery, independent source, or harmless error remove the connection
between the conviction and the legality of the search.
265
The circuit courts have adopted two competing approaches to the applica-
tion of this footnote. The general exception approach exempts all Fourth
Amendment § 1983 claims from Heck's requirements; 26 the individualized
approach requires § 1983 plaintiffs either to show favorable termination or to
show that civil success would not imply the invalidity of the conviction.2"
The latter approach better promotes the Heck values of consistency, finality,
and federalism and rewards § 1983 plaintiffs who focus on the criminal pro-
cess and refrain from simultaneous collateral attacks.' The Supreme Court
has allowed this issue to develop among the circuits by denying certiorari to
earlier appeals." 9 Due to the important constitutional right at stake, the time
has come for the Court to grant certiorari and resolve the split in favor of the
approach of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which requires a
case-by-case determination of whether a specific § 1983 illegal search claim
would imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction.
263. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994) (holding that claim for damages
related to valid conviction not cognizable under § 1983).
264. See id. at 485 (expressing Court's concerns of consistency, finality, and avoiding
collateral attack).
265. See id. at 487 n.7 (stating that § 1983 illegal search claims involving evidence ad-
mitted under independent source, inevitable discovery, or harmless error doctrines would not
imply invalidity of conviction).
266. See supra Part IV.B (discussing courts utilizing general exception approach).
267. See supra Part V.C (discussing courts utilizing individualized approach).
268. See supra Part IV.C.5 (discussing superiority of case-by-case determination).
269. Shamatizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1021
(1999); Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995).
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